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I
Introduction
The 1976 Copyright Act provided the first statutory definition of
joint authorship' by codifying the joint authorship doctrine as it had
developed in case law. Prior to the Copyright Act, joint authorship
existed only in the common law.
Joint authorship occurs when two or more authors intend to com-
bine their own individual works into one complete work.2 It is impor-
tant, however, to understand that there is a distinction between joint
authorship and a jointly owned work. A jointly owned work can en-
compass more than joint authorship, because it can exist without joint
authorship. For example, an author can transfer a partial interest in
his own work to another to create a jointly owned work. This is not
joint authorship. Joint authorship requires what its name implies:
combined works of authorship.'
The distinction between joint authorship and joint ownership is
important because significant benefits accrue to the joint author that
do not accrue to a non-author owner of an undivided interest in a
jointly owned work. A joint author shares equally in the ownership of
a joint work even if his contributions are not equal qualitatively or
quantitatively.4 In contrast, the transferee of a jointly owned work
receives only what the author is willing to transfer to him.
Additionally, the duration of rights in a work of joint authorship
is potentially longer than that of a work created by a sole author.
Under § 302(b) of the Act, the copyright term for a work of joint au-
1. "A 'joint work' is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that
their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
2. Id.
3.
A joint[ly] [owned] work will result under any one of the following circum-
stances: (1) if the work is a product of joint authorship; (2) if the author or copy-
right proprietor transfers such copyright to more than one person; (3) if the
author or copyright proprietor transfers an undivided interest in such copyright to
one or more persons, reserving to himself an undivided interest; (4) if upon the
death of the author or copyright proprietor, such copyright passes by will or intes-
tacy to more than one person; (5) if the renewal rights under the Copyright Act or
the terminated rights under the termination of transfer provisions, vest in a class
consisting of more than one person; (6) if the work is subject to state community
property laws.
1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 6.01, at 6-3 to -4 (1991) (citations
omitted).
4. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1496 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
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thorship is the life of the last surviving author plus fifty years.5 In a
work created by one author, however, § 302(a) of the Act grants pro-
tection for a duration of the life of the author plus fifty years.6
The right to file a registration for renewal rights, for pre-1978
joint works, is another benefit to joint authorship.7 Under § 304(a) of
the Act, certain classes of people, namely copyright proprietors and
copyright authors and their survivors, are entitled to renew the origi-
nal twenty-eight year term of copyright for an additional forty-seven
years.8 A person entitled to renew a copyright need not actually file a
renewal registration, because under the present law the copyright is
automatically renewed at the end of its original twenty-eight year
term.9 The renewal right vests on the first day of the renewal term' °
5. "JOINT WORKS.-In the case of a joint work prepared by two or more authors who
did not work for hire, the copyright endures for a term consisting of the life of the last
surviving author and fifty years after such last surviving author's death." 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(b) (1988).
6. "IN GENERAL.-Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists
from its creation and, except as provided by the following subsections, endures for a term
consisting of the life of the author and fifty years after the author's death." 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(a) (1988).
7. This benefit applies only to pre-1978 copyrights, because the 1976 Copyright Act,
which went into effect on January 1, 1978, abolished the renewal term for copyrights, and
instead opted for one term equal to the life of the author plus fifty years. 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(a).
8. Only copyright proprietors may renew copyrights for posthumous works, periodi-
cals, cyclopedia, or composite works and works copyrighted by a corporate body (other
than works assigned or licensed by an individual author) or by a work copyrighted by an
employer for whom such work is made for hire. For any other copyrighted work, including
a contribution to a periodical, cyclopedia, or composite work, the author of the work, or if
the author is dead, the author's widow, widower, child or children may file for renewal. If
the author has left a will but there is no surviving spouse or child, then the author's execu-
tors may file a renewal; but if there is no will then the author's next of kin may claim
renewal rights. 17 U.S.C § 304.(a)(1)(B)-(C) (Supp.' IV 1992).
9. Under the original version of section 304(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act, a person
entitled to copyright renewal was required to file a renewal registration in the last year of
the original copyright term. Failure to file a renewal resulted in the expiration of the copy-
right. The Copyright Amendments Act of 1992 (Pub. L. 102-307, Title I, § 102(a), (d), 106
Stat. 264, 266), which went into effect on June 26, 1992, amended § 304(a) to allow for
automatic renewals for copyrights secured between January 1, 1964 and December 31,
1977. Copyrights secured before January 1, 1964 are governed by the old law. The new
law does not allow the copyright to expire for failure to file a renewal in the final year of
the original copyright term. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(2)(A)-(B), (3)(A)-(B) (Supp. IV 1992).
However, the new law does give incentives to file a renewal registration. By filing a
renewal in the final year of the first term, the author who dies before the renewal period
begins will prevent derivative works which were prepared under license during the original
term from exploitation during the renewal term. If the author fails to apply for a renewal,
or if such application is not registered in the year prior to expiration of the original copy-
right term, this will allow authorized derivative works prepared during the original copy-
right term to be continued during the renewal term. However, new derivative works may
not be created during the renewal term.
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in the author or his survivors, or in the copyright owner entitled to
claim renewal at the time the application is made. If no application is
made at the beginning of the renewal term, the renewal rights will vest
in the party entitled to renewal on the last day of the original term."
Each joint author, as opposed to a transferee of an interest, also
has the nonwaivable right to terminate any copyright grants he has
made. Thirty-five years after an author executes a transfer, the author
and his statutory survivors have the right to terminate any transfer
within a five year period.' 2 The author and his successors also have
the right to terminate a transfer of a renewal term interest.' 3
Finally, only authors are entitled to the statutory moral rights that
accompany works of authorship. These rights are conferred on au-
thors of visual works of art. by the Visual Artist's Rights Act of 1990.11
As its name implies, the Visual Artist's Rights Act only applies to
works of visual art.15 The rights created by the Act include the right
to claim authorship' 6 and the right of integrity. 7 These moral rights
belong only to the author of the work and never to a transferee of the
copyright. 8 In the case of a joint work of visual art, the authors are
co-owners of the moral rights. 9 Although the rights may not be trans-
ferred, the law allows the author to waive these moral rights if the
Another incentive for filing a renewal application is that the renewal registration cer-
tificate is considered prima facia evidence of copyright validity in the renewal term and of
all the facts stated in the certificate. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1992).
10. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(2)(A)-(B) (Supp. IV 1992).
11. See Marascalco v. Fantasy, Inc., 953 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1991), in which the Ninth
Circuit found that the renewal rights to a song assigned to a music publisher did not vest in
the assignee, because the author died before the renewal term began. The court held that
although the assignee made a timely renewal registration, the assignment was only an ex-
pectancy which became a right only if the songwriter survived to the start of the renewal
term. The court reasoned that nothing in the Copyright Act's language or legislative his-
tory supported the conclusion that assigned renewal rights vest when a renewal registration
application is made. See also 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND
PRACTICE § 4.8 (1989).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (1988); see also 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, § 4.9.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1988); see also 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, § 4.9.
14. See Visual Artist's Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 113, 301, 411(a), 412, 501(a), 506 (Supp.
III 1992)).
15. A work of visual art includes paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, or still photo-
graphic images. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. III 1992).
16. Id. § 106A(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
17. Id. § 106A(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1992).
18. See id. § 106A(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
19. Id.
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author expressly agrees to do so in writing.20 Finally, these rights only
endure for "a term consisting of the life of the author." 21
Given these differences in protection between joint owners and
joint authors, it is clear why it is necessary to properly identify parties
who deserve joint author status. Without careful consideration of the
elements of joint authorship, parties undeserving of author status
under the Copyright Act would be unjustly accorded the same rights
as the true author, thereby diminishing the economic and moral bene-
fits that an author has in his work.
Part II of this Article surveys and analyzes the body of joint au-
thorship case law prior to the 1976 Copyright Act. The purpose of this
section is to give the reader an understanding of the foundation of the
joint work doctrine in the United States. Also, it serves as a backdrop
for the issues discussed in the remainder of the Article.
Part III of this Article examines the issue of whether putative co-
authors to a joint work must contribute copyrightable expression in
order to be given joint author status. This issue is not discussed in the
legislative history, nor is it settled in the federal courts. Part III,
therefore, examines federal case law and works of academic commen-
tators to illuminate the judicial and scholarly positions on this ques-
tion. This Article then uses case law and the Copyright Act to
formulate an equitable solution to the issue.
Part IV examines the central element of the joint authorship doc-
trine-intent. The Article discusses how courts go about using evi-
dence to determine whether or not two or more contributors to a
work intended to be "joint authors" within the meaning of the statute.
The central issues discussed, however, are the problems in interpret-
ing the Copyright Act in light of an author's two possible views of
intent in combining works-a broad view and a narrow view. The
broad view of intent arises from a literal reading of the definition of
"joint works" under the Copyright Act. Under this view we ask
whether the authors intended to combine their works into a "unitary
whole." This implies that the authors merely intended to combine
their works into a single greater work. The narrow view of intent re-
jects a literal reading of the "joint work" definition and requires a
deeper inquiry into the author's mind. Under this narrow view, the
court must determine whether the authors intended the legal notion
20. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (Supp. IV 1992).
21. See id. § 106A(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1992). But see id. § 106A(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1992),
which provides a copyright duration for the life of the author plus fifty years for works of
visual art created before, but sold after the effective date of the Visual Artist's Rights Act.
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of joint authorship or intended to combine their works into a larger
work.
II
Case Law Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act
Prior to its codification in the Copyright Act of 1976, the law of
joint authorship developed solely in the common law. The foundation
for joint authorship law in the United States was, for the most part,
developed in the Second Circuit of the federal courts. The first major
case was Maurel v. Smith,22 a district court case in the Second Circuit.
In Maurel, the plaintiff wrote a scenario for a comic opera and made
an agreement with the defendant who was to write a libretto for the
opera. The plaintiff alleged that the parties agreed to be co-owners of
the copyright. The defendant, without the knowledge of the plaintiff,
contracted with another party to publish the play and copyright it.23
In the district court opinion, Judge Learned Hand found that the
parties had agreed to be joint authors.24 Since there was little Ameri-
can law on the subject, Judge Hand based his opinion on English law.
Judge Hand cited Levy v. Rutley,25 which held that joint authorship
exists when several parties contribute labor to a work under a com-
mon and preconcerted design.26 Judge Hand found such a joint labor
in Maurel. He found it sufficient that'the plaintiff supplied the plot
and the defendant elaborated on it.27
The law was further defined in Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v.
Jerry Vogel Music Co.28 Here, the plaintiff composed words for a song
and sold it to a publisher. The publisher, without the plaintiff's knowl-
edge, hired another person to write the music for the words. The en-
tire song was then copyrighted.29 Judge Hand, this time sitting as an
appellate judge, found that the song was jointly authored. He stated
that it was irrelevant whether the authors worked in concert, so long
as the authors meant for their contributions to be embodied in a single
work. Judge Hand ruled that the song was not a "composite work"
where each part, words and music, were originally intended to be used
separately, but that from the start each author intended that their
22. 220 F. 195 (S.D.N.Y.. 1915).
23. Id. at 197.
24. Id. at 198.
25. L.R. 6 C.P. 523 (1871).
26. Maurel, 220 F. at 199.
27. Maurel, 220 F. at 199, 200.
28. 140 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944).
29. id. at 266, 267.
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work be enjoyed and performed together as a whole.3" So it is not
necessary that the authors work together or even know each other, as
long as they create their work with the preconcerted intent that it will
be joined with another author's work.
Then in 1946, in another opinion in which Judge Learned Hand
joined, the scope of joint authorship was stretched even further. In
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co.,3 commonly called
the "Melancholy Baby" case, Ernie Burnett wrote the music and his
wife wrote the lyrics to a song called "Melancholy." They in turn of-
fered to sell the song and copyright to a man named Bennet. Bennet
was unhappy with the song's lyrics, so with the consent of Mr. Burnett,
Bennet hired Norton to write new lyrics. Burnett then transferred his
copyright to Bennet. Eventually the song, with Burnett's music and
Norton's lyrics became entitled "Melancholy Baby." Years later,
when a dispute arose over ownership of the copyright in "Melancholy
Baby,"32 the court held that Burnett and Norton were joint authors of
the song.33
As in Marks, then, it is only necessary that each author have
knowledge that their separate works will be used eventually as part of
one larger unitary work. Furthermore, the Shapiro case holds that if
author A intended from the beginning to work with author B, but
later author C's work is substituted for that of author B's work, then
A and C will be considered joint authors of the work that they cre-
ated. It was not necessary that A and C originally collaborated be-
cause A had the intent to put his music with someone's lyrics, and C
wrote his lyrics intending to combine it with A's music. It does not
matter that A originally wanted to combine his music with B's lyrics,
since he still wanted to create a unitary work. A, therefore, had the
necessary intent for a preconcerted, common design. A was in collab-
oration with C, not because he consented to the addition of C's lyrics,
but because he had the prior intent to combine his work with that of
another. It is also true that although A and C are joint authors of
their work, A and B still remain joint authors of their own work. A
and C's work would be classified as a "new work" which is separate
from A's and B's original works.3 4
A further and much criticized extension of the joint authorship
doctrine was created in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music
30. Id. at 267.
31. 161 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 820 (1947).
32. Id. at 407-08.
33. Id. at 409.
34. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 161 F.2d at 410.
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Co.," (a different case by the same name) otherwise known as the
"12th Street Rag" decision. In that case, an author wrote a piano solo
without any intent of combining his work with that of another author.
He wanted his solo to stand alone. The author assigned his rights to a
publisher. The publisher then hired another author to compose lyrics
to the piano solo.3 6
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the combination
of the music and the lyrics was a joint work.37 This holding signifi-
cantly extended the prior case law in two respects. First, it allowed the
assignee of a work to form the requisite intent to create a joint work,
rather than the author himself. Second, the holding allowed the work
to be considered a joint work even though the intent to create a joint
work did not exist at the time of authorship. This decision also
showed that it did not matter if this subsequent intent was formed by
the assignee or by the author himself.
The "12th Street Rag" case basically eliminated the requirement
of some form of collaboration or a preconcerted common design. This
requirement was the foundation of all the previous Second Circuit
cases as set down by Judge Learned Hand.
In Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc.,"s the court noted that the
"12th Street Rag" case had been severely criticized by commenta-
tors.39 In Picture Music, a writer for Walt Disney Productions com-
posed music and lyrics for a song used in the "Three Little Pigs"
cartoon created by Disney. TWo writers working at Irving Berlin, Inc.,
a publisher, made some simple changes to the song in order to adapt it
for use as a popular song. Disney liked the idea and the changes and
35. 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1955).
36. Id. at 570.
37. Id.
38. 314 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 997 (1972).
39.
[N]o longer does there seem to be required a preconcerted common design or any
active collaboration. It is now sufficient if there be any "fusion of effort" in the
creation of a revision, adaptation or modification of any existing work. The au-
thors of the original work are not required to have any knowledge of the modifi-
cation, nor do they have to take part in it. Any action on the part of their
transferees which utilizes the preexisting work in the creation of a new version
thereof is sufficient to make the original creators joint authors with those who
later revise their work. Not only does this extension of the joint authorship con-
cept do violence to the renewal policy of the law, but it would appear to extend,
for an indefinite period, the control of the original author over any subsequent
revisions of his work.
314 F. Supp. at 646 (quoting Cary, Joint Ownership of Copyrights, in 1 STUDIES ON COPY-
RIGHT 689, 696 (1963)).
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agreed to assign Berlin all ownership rights to the song. Years later,
when it came time for the rights to the song to be renewed, one of the
writers who adapted the song for Berlin claimed to be a joint owner.
The writer's assignee brought suit to determine ownership.4 °
The district court in Picture Music criticized the "12th Street
Rag" decision because it seemingly had done away with the require-
ment of collaboration or a preconcerted common design.41 Despite
this criticism, the court in Picture Music did not disavow the doctrine,
but refused to apply it to the facts of the case. The court found that
there was no collaboration between the authors at Disney and the au-
thors at Berlin, and there was no intent by the authors at Disney to
create a new work. The court held that to deem the song a joint work
would require that the contributions made by the Berlin writers be
more substantial and significant.42
This holding seemingly contradicts the court's earlier criticism of
the "12th Street Rag" doctrine. What the court appears to be saying is
that even though the writer at Disney did not originally intend his
work to be combined with another's work, if someone later makes a
substantial contribution then the resulting work will be considered
jointly authored. The Picture Music case thus suggests that collabora-
tion or preconcerted common design are not necessary to create a
work of joint authorship.
In another Southern District of New York case, Donna v. Dodd,
Mead & Co.,43 the court stated that although Picture Music criticized
the "12th Street Rag" approach it did not intend to depart from the
doctrine.44 The court in Donna therefore applied the "12th Street
Rag" doctrine to the facts of the case before it. In Donna, plaintiff
Donna and defendant Larson co-authored a book called Boy of the
Masai. Donna wrote the text and Larson supplied the photographs
for the book. Another defendant, Dodd, Mead & Co., published the
book. Later, Larson and his wife authored three other books which
40. Picture Music, 314 F.Supp. at 642-43.
41. The district court cited with approval PHILIP WITTENBERG, THE PROTECTION OF
LITERARY PROPERTY 67 (1968), which suggested that the copyright statutes be revised to
define "'joint work' as one 'prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole,'
thereby expressly overruling the '12th Street Rag' doctrine." Picture Music, 314 F.Supp. at
646.
42. Picture Music, 314 F. Supp. at 647 ("[A] more substantial and significant contribu-
tion was required to reach a finding of joint ownership.")
43. 374 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
44. Id. at 431 ("While it is true that Picture Music points out that the Marks-Melan-
choly Baby-12th Street Rag approach has been criticized, there is no indication that the
court intended to depart from it.").
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had exactly the same format as that of Boy of the Masai. These other
three books were entitled Boy of Nepal, Boy of Dahomey, and Boy of
Bolivia. Dodd, Mead & Co. also published these books. The plaintiff
argued that she and Larson were sole proprietors of the copyright on
Boy of the Masai and that publication of the three later works was an
infringement of her copyright. It was the plaintiff's theory that Boy of
the Masai was a composite work, and therefore she and Larson pos-
sessed separate copyrights for each of their individual contributions.
Larson claims there was no infringement, because he was a joint au-
thor of Boy of the Masai.45
The court applied the "12th Street Rag" and "Melancholy Baby"
doctrines and concluded that Boy of the Masai was a joint work. The
court held that although the defendant's pictures were not originally
intended for the plaintiff's book, Larson had intended to put them in
someone's book, although he did not know whose book.46 So under
Marks and "Melancholy Baby" cases, the plaintiff's and defendant's
subsequent collaboration after separate original authorships was suffi-
cient to create a joint work. The court went on to say that even if the
defendant never intended to use his pictures in a book, that under
"12th Street Rag," there still was a joint work, because once the plain-
tiff and defendant agreed to combine their works it became evident
that the defendant had the intent to put his work into a joint work.47
In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co.,48 however, the Second
Circuit noted that the "12th Street Rag" doctrine had been criticized
45. Id. at 430.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 538 F.2d 14 (2nd Cir. 1976). In this case the British writers and performers known
as "Monty Python" sought a preliminary injunction to prevent ABC television from broad-
casting edited versions of its work in the United States. "Monty Python" wrote scripts for
the BBC broadcasting network to be used in a television series. These two parties had a
contract that gave "Monty Python" great control over the script, and required the BBC to
get "Monty Python's" permission to make changes. Once recorded, the program could not
be altered. Under the contract, the BBC was allowed to license the programs for transmis-
sion overseas. In 1973, Time-Life Films acquired the rights to distribute "Monty Python"
in the United States. The BBC allowed Time-Life to edit the films for commercials and
government broadcasting laws, although this was not part of BBC's contract with "Monty
Python". In 1975, ABC agreed with Time-Life to broadcast two 90 minute specials featur-
ing three half hour segments of "Monty Python". After the first 90 minute broadcast,
"Monty Python" was appalled at how ABC had edited the film. "Monty Python" tried to
negotiate with ABC prior to the second showing, but ABC refused. "Monty Python" then
filed an action to enjoin ABC from broadcasting and for damages. The district court de-
nied the preliminary injunction because ABC would have suffered a significant financial
loss. "Monty Python" then appealed.
One of ABC's many arguments on appeal was that "Monty Python" and the BBC
were joint authors of the film segments under the "12th Street Rag" doctrine. ABC argued
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as inequitable. The court stated that, "this court appears to have re-
ceded from a broad application of the joint work doctrine where the
contract which leads to collaboration between authors indicates that
one will retain a superior interest. '49 Although the Second Circuit
appeared to have retreated a little from the "12th Street Rag" doc-
trine, it had certainly not abandoned the doctrine at this point.
The 1976 Copyright Act, for the most part, codified the joint
work doctrine as laid out by the case law in the Second Circuit. The
Copyright Act went into effect on January 1, 1978. The key "joint
works" provision in the Copyright Act is contained in 17 U.S.C. § 101.
There, a "joint work" is defined as "a work prepared by two or more
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into in-
separable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole."5 This lan-
guage suggests that Congress did not want to go as far as the "12th
Street Rag" doctrine which had vitiated the preconcerted common de-
sign and collaboration requirements as laid out in prior case law. The
1976 Copyright Act clearly requires that two authors have the intent
to create a unified work.
Furthermore, the legislative history behind the Copyright Act
makes it clear that Congress intended to reject the "12th Street Rag"
doctrine. The legislative history demonstrates the congressional in-
tent that in a joint work, the authors must collaborate with the inten-
tion to create a joint work at the time the writing is made.5 In
addition, the Register's 1961 Report stated that the copyright register
would not go as far as the "12th Street Rag" decision, but would fol-
low the rules as developed in the previous case law.52 Thus, it is clear
that the case law as established by Judge Hand in the Second Circuit,
with the exception of the later "12th Street Rag" case, has been codi-
fied by the 1976 Copyright Act.
that the script written by "Monty Python" and the, program recorded by the BBC were
"symbiotic elements of a single production." Id. at 22. Therefore, since the BBC held an
undivided ownership interest, it could edit the program as it saw fit. The court held that
the parties probably did not consider themselves joint authors, but the issue should be
further explored at trial. In any event, the argument did not present a bar to issuance of a
preliminary injunction. The appellate court, not finding the potential financial harm as the
district court did, issued the injunction. Id. at 20.
49. Id. at 22.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
51. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736.
52. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON THE GENERAL
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 90 (Comm. Print 1961).
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The Nature of the Author's Contribution
One of the major issues of the joint work doctrine, whether each
putative co-author's contribution must be copyrightable, remains un-
settled. Not only are academic commentators split on the issue,53 but
the twelve federal circuit courts are not in agreement either.54 The
Supreme Court has yet to pass judgment on the issue. This lack of
unanimity may be due to the relative sparsity of case law dealing with
the various issues of joint works. In particular, there is little case law
regarding the idea/expression dichotomy as it relates to the joint work
doctrine." It is a fundamental maxim of copyright law that copyright
protects only expression and not ideas. The issue is whether this
maxim extends to joint works. This part will examine this important
and controversial issue and attempt to find an answer that comports
with the purpose of the copyright laws and the probable intent of
Congress.
It is a fundamental principle of copyright law that copyright
"does not protect ideas, but only expression of ideas." 56 The dividing
line between noncopyrightable and copyrightable works of authorship
is the line that divides idea from expression. In copyright ideology, an
idea has its own separate existence, so to speak, from anything that is
human. Ideas are discovered by humans through the process of
thought, but cannot be claimed as a possession, like a physical object
can be claimed. Expression, on the other hand, can be claimed as a
possession. Expression is a description of an idea as an individual sees
it, and that description is a personal possession of the person.
The Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein57 held that "[u]nlike a pat-
ent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection
53. See infra text accompaning notes 62-71.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 72-108.
55.
Case law concerning joint authorship in relation to the idea/expression dichotomy
is sparse largely because the broad scope of the work for hire doctrine under the
1909 Act tended to draw disputes in which one party claimed to be the creative
motivating force in the production of a copyrightable work into the ambit of that
doctrine. With the substantial cutback of the work for hire doctrine under the
1976 Act, more cases of this genre can be expected to appear under the joint
authorship rubric.
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1497 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
56. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir.
1986).
57. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
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is given only to the expression of the idea-not the idea itself."58
Thus a copywritten work must fall on the expression side of the divid-
ing line, and anything on the idea side is unprotected.
The idea/expression dichotomy is now expressly stated in
§ 102(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act.59 The rule does not allow copy-
right protection for any idea.
Although the idea/expression dichotomy rule may seem like an
easy method to weed out noncopyrightable material, in practice it is
often difficult to distinguish idea from expression. As Judge Learned
Hand said, the distinction in any given case will "inevitably be adhoc."'6
A. Viewpoint of Academic Authorities
The conflicting positions of two prominent copyright commenta-
tors represent the division between the various federal circuits on the
issue of whether each author must contribute copyrightable expres-
sion in order to be considered a joint author.6 The minority view is
58. Id. at 217. The court in Mazer stated this principle of copyright based on its read-
ing of Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). In Baker, the plaintiff wrote a book that de-
scribed a bookkeeping system, including forms used to implement the system. The
defendant wrote a book about the same system which contained similiar forms, and the
plaintiff claimed copyright infringement. The court held that use of the forms did not
infringe the plaintiff's work because the forms were necessary to explain the system. The
court reasoned that an exclusive right to the use of the forms would amount to an exclusive
right in the bookkeeping system. Because copyright law does not protect ideas themselves,
but rather only the expression of the idea, an exclusive right to the forms would give an
impermissible monopoly in the idea itself (the bookkeeping system). Thus, the defendant
was entitled to copy the plaintiff's forms, to the extent that their use was the only way to
express the ideas. However, any other expression of the plaintiff which was not necessary
to implement the plaintiff's method, was subject to copyright infringement. Id. at 102-04.
Because one of the purposes of copyright is the dissemination of knowledge for use by
others, copyright does not extend to exclusive rights in basic ideas. Ideas, however, can
usually be expressed in a multitude of ways, therefore allowing an endless number of au-
thors to get copyrights on works which deal with the same idea. See Dymow v. Bolton, 11
F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir. 1926).
One factor used by courts in determining whether work is idea or expression is the
amount of creativity involved. Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 906
(3d Cir. 1975) (stick figures depicted on exercise equipment not copyrightable expression
despite substantial investment in ascertaining the physiological techniques the figures con-
veyed). Another factor is whether, or the extent to which, the idea may be expressed in a
variety of ways. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983).
59. See Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1222, 1234 ("The legislative history of this
section, adopted in 1976, makes clear that section 102(b) was intended to express the idea-
expression dichotomy.").
60. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp. 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
61. See infra text accompanying notes 72-108.
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espoused by Professor Nimmer, while Professor Goldstein holds the
majority view.
Professor Nimmer takes the minority view that an author need
not make a copyrightable contribution to a work in order to be con-
sidered a joint author.62  Nimmer's position states that neither the
Copyright Act of 1976 nor its legislative history supports the idea that
an author must make a copyrightable contribution. He points to the
Act's definition of "joint work,"'63 which contains no separate require-
ment that a putative joint author contribute copyrightable expression.
Further, Congress made "intention" the touchstone of joint author-
ship status while saying nothing of a copyrightable contribution
requirement. 64
Although Nimmer favors the absence of a copyrightable contri-
bution requirement, he does propose certain limits on achieving joint
author status. In keeping with the case law, 65 Nimmer would not re-
quire that each putative co-author make equal contributions, either
quantitatively or qualitatively; the contribution, however, would need
to be more than de minimis. By de minimis, Nimmer means simply
that more than a word or phrase must be contributed. Nimmer states
that the standards for de minimis contribution and copyrightability are
not the same. For example, if one author suggests plot ideas and an-
other author creates the written story, Nimmer would consider them
joint authors. Nimmer would say that contribution of ideas alone
would be sufficient for joint author status.66 Because the creator of
ideas has a major role in the story, his contribution would be more
than de minimis.67 In addition, under Nimmer's theory, to be consid-
62. 1 NIMMER, supra note 3, § 6.07 at 6-22.
63. "A 'joint work' is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that
their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
64. H. R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 51, at 120, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5736.
65. Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) ("But I take it that, if two per-
sons agree to write a piece, there being an original joint design and the co-operation of the
two in carrying out that joint design, there can be no difficulty in saying they are joint
authors of the work, though one may do a larger share than the other." (quoting Levy v.
Rutly, L.R. 6 C.P. 523, 530 (1871))).
66. 1 NIMMER, supra note 3, § 6.07, at 6-22.
67. In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
the appellate court addressed the issue of whether the creator of a simple base for a statue
could be considered a joint author with the creator of the statue itself. In grappling with
the issue of whether an author needs to make a copyrightable contribution, the court
stated, "If Nimmer is correct on the point that the contribution of a joint author need not
be copyrightable 'standing alone,' even CCNV's choice of the title "Third World America"
and the legend for the pedestal ... while not independently copyrightable ... may count,
along with other CCNV contributions, toward meeting the 'more than de minimis' thresh-
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ered a joint author, one's contribution has to be one of authorship.
Nimmer points to the example of one who merely contributes financ-
ing to a project. This would not be sufficient to convey joint author-
ship status.68
On the other hand, the majority position held by Professor Gold-
stein is that to achieve co-author status, the "author" must contribute
original expression capable of standing on its own as the subject mat-
ter of copyright.69 Professor Goldstein considers the language of the
"joint work" definition7" to mean that the contribution of each puta-
tive co-author must be copyrightable in itself. The use of the word
author suggests that there must be a copyrightable work of authorship
as required by the Copyright Act.71 Otherwise, any subject matter
that does not meet the copyrightability requirements of the Copyright
Act must fall into the public domain. Any material in the public do-
main may be freely used by anyone and may not be exploited by just
one person.72
Like Nimmer, Goldstein states that each author's contribution
need not be equal in quantity or quality. But, no matter how small the
contribution, the contribution must amount to original expression,
and not merely the suggestion of ideas.73
B. Positions Taken by the Federal Circuits
Like the commentators, the several federal circuits are divided on
the issue of copyrightable contributions. Other circuits, as well as the
Supreme Court, have either not addressed the issue or explicitly de-
cided not to make a ruling on the question. The following is a sum-
mary of the positions held by the various federal circuits. The First
Circuit has yet to address the issue of copyrightable contributions.
old required for joint authorship." Id. at 1496 n.15. The court never decided the issue of
joint authorship, but instead remanded the case for a more comprehensive inquiry into the
joint authorship issue. Id. at 1498.
68. 1 NIMMER, supra note 3, § 6.07, at 6-22. See also Forward v. Thorogood, 758 F.
Supp. 782, 784 (D.Mass. 1991), affd, 985 F.2d 604 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Although he arranged
for the recording sessions, Forward made no musical or artistic contribution to them....
Because Forward provided no significant creative contribution, he cannot qualify as a joint
author.").
69. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, § 4.2.1.2, at 379.
70. "A 'joint work' is a work prepared by two or more authors ...." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(emphasis added).
71. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, § 4.2.1.2, at 379. "Copyright protection subsists, in
accordance with this title, in original works of authorship .... 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
72. 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, § 4.2.1.2, at 379.
73. For cases that support the Goldstein point of view, see Childress v. Taylor, 945
F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991), Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1990), and
S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989).
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However, in Forward v. Thorogood,74 the district court ruled that one
cannot attain joint authorship status without making a significant crea-
tive contribution.75
Unfortunately, the court did not define what constitutes a crea-
tive contribution. Would the contribution of ideas meet the de
minimis threshold and therefore be sufficient for the authors to attain
joint author status? 76 The court suggested that if the plaintiff had pre-
pared the musician's microphones, served as engineer, directed the
manner in which the songs were played and sung, or simply selected
the songs to be recorded, then he would have made a sufficient crea-
tive contribution. 77 These contributions would appear to be expres-
sions of the producer's idea of how the album should sound, and are
therefore copyrightable. This reasoning appears to support Gold-
stein's point of view. These types of contributions go beyond ideas
into expression. The First Circuit has yet to rule explicitly on the is-
sue, however.
The Second Circuit, where the majority of copyright cases have
been decided, recently announced its position on the minimum contri-
bution requirement in Childress v. Taylor.78 In Childress, the Second
74. 758 F. Supp. 782, 783 (D. Mass. 1991). In Forward, the plaintiff, a music fan and
record collector, heard Thorogood's band play and became interested in getting a studio to
sign a record deal with them. The plaintiff arranged two recording sessions for the band,
and kept the tapes of those sessions which had never been publicly released. Later, the
band achieved great recording success. The plaintiff wanted to capitalize on the band's
success by releasing the two tapes that he possessed. After the band refused to allow the
plaintiff to release the tapes, the plaintiff filed suit to have himself declared the sole owner
of the tapes. The band counterclaimed that they were sole owners of the copyright.
75. Id. at 784.
76. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the idea/expres-
sion dichotomy.
77. Forward, 758 F.Supp. at 784.
78. 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991). In Childress, the defendant Taylor was an actress who
became interested in developing a play about the life of "Moms" Mabley, a famous black
comedienne. Taylor conducted research on Mabley's life, then hired the plaintiff, Alice
Childress, to write the play. Taylor gave Childress all of her research and conducted fur-
ther research at Childress' request. Although Childress wrote the play, Taylor did most of
the research, selected "key" facts to include in the play, and also discussed with Childress
the inclusion of general scenes and characters in the play. Childress was responsible for
the structure and dialogue of the play. Childress copyrighted the play in her name only.
Taylor produced the play at a theater in the summer of 1986. After this production, Taylor
and Childress then attempted to formalize their relationship, by exchanging draft contracts
between their agents. In the meantime, they both consented to a second production of the
play in early 1987. Childress received a new copyright for new material added to the play
by the production company. Soon thereafter, their relationship fell apart, and Taylor hired
another person to write a "Moms" Mabley play. Taylor gave the new playwrite a copy of
Childress' play and asked him to revise it. This new play was produced in the summer of
1987, and no reference was made to Childress' contribution. Childress then sued Taylor
and other defendants alleging violation of the Copyright Act. Taylor contended that she
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Circuit concluded, somewhat hesitantly, that each co-author must
make a copyrightable contribution to be considered a joint author.79
The court found the issue "troublesome" because both sides of the
argument appeared rational and legitimate.
The Childress court argued, on the one hand that if the objective
of copyright is to encourage creative works of authorship, the law
should not require every author to contribute copyrightable expres-
sion. When any author creates a work, he first has an idea which he
expresses in some form. So why not give joint author status to one
who supplies ideas to another author who creates the expression? Af-
ter all, in the end, the work is no less creative or valuable than if one
person had done it alone.8' The court also recognized Nimmer's argu-
ment that the Copyright Act does not require that each contribution
be copyrightable. 81 Further, the Copyright Act's reference to "au-
thor" does not necessarily require a copyrightable contribution, but
appears to have been used only in the sense as an originator of an
idea, whether or not the expression of that idea constitutes copyright-
able subject matter.82
Despite these observations, the court sided with the Goldstein/
majority point of view. The court used three different rationales to
justify this conclusion. 83 First, by requiring a copyrightable contribu-
tion, spurious claims of joint authorship by undeserving contributors
would be avoided. Second, this holding strikes a good balance be-
tween the copyright laws and contract laws. The Copyright Act will
always protect those who have made copyrightable contributions,
while contract law protects any other contributor. For example, under
the work-for-hire doctrine,84 an employer can contract for another to
create a work, but the employer will be considered the "author."
Likewise, a person who contributes noncopyrightable material could
was a joint author of the play. Id. at 502-504. The court held that Taylor was not a joint
author of the play. The court did not have to decide whether Taylor's contributions were
independently copyrightable because the court found that in no event did Childress possess
the intent necessary for joint authorship in light of the total lack of evidence that Childress
intended to be a joint author of the play with Taylor. Id. at 509.
79. Id. at 507.
80. Id. at 506.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 507.
84. "WORKS MADE FOR HIRE.-In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or
other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this
title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed
by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988).
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make a contract to have part ownership85 of the copyright. Third, the
court felt it was more consistent with the copyright laws to require a
joint author to make a copyrightable contribution.
The Third Circuit, in Andrien v. Southern Ocean County Cham-
ber of Commerce,86 explicitly decided to leave the issue open. The
Fourth and Fifth Circuits have not addressed the issue of copyright-
able contributions.
The Sixth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, seemed to imply by
its rationale in the case that each author must make a copyrightable
contribution, though it did not expressly so hold.87
The Seventh Circuit has yet to decide the issue, but in a lower
court of that circuit there is support for Nimmer's position. In John-
stone v. Fox,88 the district court focused on the factors of authorship
and intent to create an inseparable work. The court suggested that
authorship status is appropriate for one who actively participates in
85. Although the person could contract to be a part owner, he would not be joint
author and therefore not entitled to the benefits of authorship. See supra notes 1-3 and
accompanying text.
86. 927 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1991). In Andrien, the plaintiff assembled a map of Long
Beach Island, New Jersey. He created the map by looking at other maps and by driving on
the street, taking down street names and measuring distances. The plaintiff then took his
rough sketches to a printing company to prepare the map for printing. The printer had to
coordinate the scales, reletter the street names, and add certain designations. The plaintiff
asserted that the printer performed these tasks under his direction. He claims to have
spent an hour each day for three weeks supervising the work. The defendants, which in-
cluded among others the Southern Ocean County Chamber of Commerce, distributed the
maps without the plaintiff's permission. The plaintiff claimed this was copyright infringe-
ment. The district court held that the plaintiff could not assert a claim because he was not
the author. Although he had supervised the work, the court held that the plaintiff did not
fix his ideas into a tangible medium of expression; this was done by the printing company.
The court on appeal held that the plaintiff was an author. Although the plaintiff did
not fix the work himself, he was not required to. The printing company was like a stenog-
rapher who fixed the plaintiff's expression for him under his authority. Since this tran-
scription was essentially by rote, the plaintiff can be considered the author. Id. at 135-36.
The case was then remanded to determine if the printing company was a joint author due
to its contributions. Id. at 136. The court refused to decide whether copyrightable contri-
butions were required to receive joint author status. Id. at 137.
87. In BancTraining Video Systems v. First American Corp., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
2014 (6th Cir. 1992), party A selected a topic for a video and party B was hired to prepare
an outline of the script. A reviewed the outline and on approval, B wrote the full script. A
then reviewed the script writing and supervised the video production. The court held that
A's supervision of the video production and use of her ideas in the script did not make her
a joint author. The court's rationale suggests it would require a copyrightable contribution
from each purported joint author. It stated that the Copyright Act denies authorship sta-
tus to one who only conceives an idea. Because of a trend in the case law, and because of
the Supreme Court's definition of "author," the court found no support for Nimmer's con-
tention that the author's intent to be joint authors should control even if a. person contrib-
uted only skeletal ideas that were more than de minimis.
88. 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1229 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
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preparing the work and controls the development of the design. 9 The
court indicated that the intent to create a joint work was more impor-
tant than the presence of copyrightable expression. The requirements
are active participation, combined with intent.9" Although this deci-
sion leaves no indication as to what "active participation" would entail
or what was meant by "preparing," the decision did not explicitly rule
out that by simply feeding ideas to another, one could become a joint
author. This would support Nimmer's point of view.
The Eighth Circuit has yet to rule on the issue, but the Ninth
Circuit has held that each author must make a copyrightable contribu-
tion.91 In S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., the Ninth Circuit ruled that a
person who described the needs of her company to a software
programmer, and who told the programmer what tasks the software
should perform and how to sort data, was not a joint author of the
software.92 The court, relying on Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow
Dental Laboratory, Inc.,9 held that "a person who merely describes to
an author what the commissioned work should do or look like is not a
joint author for purposes of the Copyright Act."94 The court also
cited the Supreme Court's definition of author95 as the definition re-
quired by the Copyright Act's "joint work" definition. 96
It was in Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross,97 however, that the Ninth
Circuit explicitly held that joint authorship requires each author to
make a copyrightable contribution. 9 In this case, the defendant,
Ross, and a man by the name of Wigginton agreed to write a com-
89. Id. at 1232.
90. Id.
91. Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir: 1990); S.O.S., Inc. v. Pay-
day, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989).
92. S.O.S., 886 F.2d at 1087.
93. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986). In Whelan, the plaintiff was the developer of a com-
puter program for the defendant's dental laboratory. After substantial investment by the
plaintiff, the defendant broke off the relationship and developed and marketed his own
program based on the structure of the plaintiffs program. The plaintiff thereafter sued the
defendant for copyright infringement. Id. at 1225-27.
One of the issues in the case related to the idea/expression dichotomy. The issue was
whether copyright protection could extend to the mere structure of the program. The de-
fendant argued that structure was an idea, not an expression. The court held that structure
was expression and therefore copyrightable. Id. at 1238-39.
94. S.O.S., Inc., 886 F.2d at 1087.
95. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) ("As a
general rule, the author is the party who actually creates the work, that is, the person who
translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection.").
96. "A 'joint work' is a work prepared by two or more authors..." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(emphasis added).
97. 916 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1990).
98. Id. at 521.
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puter program. The program was a spreadsheet to be called "Mac-
Calc." Ross was to work on the "engine" of the program, and
Wigginton was to work on the program interface. To assist Wigginton,
Ross contributed a list of handwritten commands to use in the inter-
face. Eventually the two had disagreements and split up. Wigginton
took his interface to Ashton-Tate, the plaintiff, for use in a spread-
sheet program. Together they developed "Full Impact." Ross created
"McCabe," also a spreadsheet program. Ashton-Tate sought a declar-
atory judgment asking that it be declared the copyright owner of all
the "Full Impact" software. Ross counter-claimed damages for Ash-
ton-Tate's use of his commands in their program.99
The Ninth Circuit held that Ross was not a joint author of the
"Full Impact" program. The court held that the commands were mere
ideas, not expression; therefore Ross could not be considered an au-
thor entitled to copyright protection. 1°° The court used rationale simi-
lar to that used by the court in S.O.S, Inc. It compared the Nimmer
and Goldstein points of view and concluded that Goldstein's was the
better view. The court concluded that although "this issue is not com-
pletely settled in the case law, our circuit holds that joint authorship
requires each author to make an independently copyrightable
contribution.' '101
The Tenth Circuit has yet to rule on the issue, but the Eleventh
Circuit's holding in M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc."°2
supports the majority position. In this case, M.G.B. claimed that
Ameron copied one of its floor plans for a home design. M.G.B. dis-
tributed an advertising flyer depicting the floor plan and measure-
ments. M.G.B. claimed that Ameron used the flyer to design a similar
home. The actual floor plan was drafted by Unlimited Drafting Serv-
99. Id. at 518-19.
100. The court also concluded that Ross' contributions to the MacCalc Prototype did
not make him a joint author of the Full Impact program. Ross argued that since he wrote
the engine to the MacCalc Prototype, which was copyrightable expression, that he there-
fore was a joint author of the entire program. He claimed an undivided interest in all of
the software, including Wiggenton's interface, and that he was also a joint author of the
Full Impact program. Id. at 522.
The court agreed that Ross could be a joint author of the MacCalc program, assuming
Ross and Wiggenton agreed to be joint authors. The court, however, did not reach this
issue because,. even assuming Ross was a joint author of MacCalc, this would not entitle
him to joint authorship of the Full Impact program. In Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d
1313, 1317 (2d Cir. 1989), the court held that joint authorship in a prior work does not
entitle one to joint authorship in any derivative work of the prior work. Derivative works
are independently copyrightable apart from their underlying works. Ross' argument would
undercut this basic principle. Ashton-Tate, 916 F.2d at 522.
101. Id. at 521.
102. 903 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990).
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ices, and the copyright was listed under M.G.B.'s name as a work-
made-for-hire. 1 3
The Eleventh Circuit held that the work was not a work-made-
for-hire. Although M.G.B. exercised control and direction over the
finished product, the facts showed that Unlimited was an independent
contractor. °4 The 'court then discussed whether M.G.B. and Unlim-
ited could be considered joint authors due to the control and direction
of the product that M.G.B. exhibited. 5 The court held that M.G.B.
was not a joint author of the floor plan. To be considered a joint au-
thor, the court would require the author to be a "creator."'0 6 To be a
creator, the author must fix his expression in a copy.'0 7 It is the
"preparer" of the work who is considered the author. In this case,
however, M.G.B. just provided Unlimited with rough sketches of how
the home should look. The sketch did not form an inseparable part of
the finished work, so it was clear that M.G.B. could not be considered
a creator.'
0 8
The D.C. Circuit in Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid 0 9 supports the minority view taken by Nimmer. In CCNV, the
plaintiff commissioned the defendant to create a statue that depicted
homeless people in a nativity-like scene. The defendant received
some ideas from the plaintiff as to how the statue should look, but for
the most part the work was the creation of the defendant. The plain-
tiff did, however, build the base on which the statue was to rest. The
plaintiff wanted to take the statue on an extended tour of the United
States, but the defendant, worried that the statue might be damaged,
refused to let the statue leave his studio. The plaintiff brought an ac-
tion to establish copyright ownership of the statue."0
The court determined that the plaintiff did not own the copyright
under a work-for-hire theory because the facts indicated that the de-
fendant was an independent contractor."' The court discussed the is-
sue of whether the plaintiff was a joint author of the statue. The
court, in finding that the plaintiff was a joint author, quoted Nimmer
that "one may qualify as a joint author even if his contribution, 'stand-
103. Id. at 1487-88, 1490.
104. Id. at 1492.
105. Id. at 1492-93.
106. Id. at 1493, see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (A work is "created" when "it is fixed in
a copy ... for the first time.").
107. Id. at 1493; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
108. M.G.B. Homes, 903 F.2d at 1493.
109. 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
110. Id. at 1487-88.
111. Id. at 1494.
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ing alone would not be copyrightable.""' 2 However, the court tem-
pered its apparent support of Nimmer by stating in a footnote, "If
Nimmer is correct on the point that the contribution of a joint author
need not be copyrightable 'standing alone,' other contributions by
CCNV may also meet the threshold.""' 3 The phrase "if Nimmer is
correct" indicates that the court is not sure of the soundness of Nim-
mer's position. The court remanded the issue to determine whether
the parties intended to create a joint work. The issue was not decided
when Reid went to the Supreme Court. There, the court simply held
that CCNV may be a joint author, then remanded the case for deter-
mination of the issue." 4
As this survey shows, of the circuits that have taken up the copy-
rightable contribution issue, the overwhelming majority favor requir-
ing a joint author to make a copyrightable contribution. Although
some district courts favor the Nimmer view, only one appellate court,
the D.C. Circuit, has shown any signs of agreement. Until the
Supreme Court decides the issue or the Congress amends the Copy-
right Act, it appears the issue will remain unsettled.
C. Discussion
Now that the prevailing opinions of the federal courts and the
commentators have been set forth for comparison, this Article makes
its own analysis of whether joint authorship requires putative co-au-
thors to make copyrightable contributions, and then suggests how the
law could be implemented more equitably.
As stated earlier, the Second Circuit in Childress found the issue
of whether joint authorship requires copyrightable contributions
"troublesome" because both sides of the argument have an air of le-
gitimacy." 5 If the purpose of copyright law is to create a balance be-
tween incentive to create and dissemination of information to
112. Id. at 1496.
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Since neither CCNV nor Reid appealed the appellate court's remand order, the
court found no need to pass judgment on the joint authorship issue. The court did state,
however, that "as the Court of Appeals made clear, CCNV nevertheless may be a joint
author of the sculpture if, on remand, the District Court determines that CCNV and Reid
prepared the work 'with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable
or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.' 17 U.S.C. § 101. In that case, CCNV and Reid
would be co-owners of the copyright in the work." 490 U.S. 730, 753 (1989) (footnotes
omittted).
115. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 506 (2d Cir. 1991); see supra text accompanying
note 79.
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promote learning, culture, and development, 116 then giving joint au-
thor status to one who feeds ideas to another who creates expression
will not thwart the purpose. After all, without the idea, it is quite
possible the expression would never exist. However, granting author-
ship status to a person who has only ideas would cut against one of the
fundamental tenets of copyright law: Copyright exists for the protec-
tion of expression only. 17
After analyzing the statute, the case law, and the legislative his-
tory, the view that each author must contribute copyrightable material
is the more legitimate conclusion. Although not always equitable, ab-
sent an amendment to the Copyright Act by Congress, it seems ines-
capable that only copyrightable expression is protected by law, even in
the joint work context.
Arguments in favor of copyrightable contributions are too strong
to overcome. As a starting point, it is always best to look at the plain
meaning of the statutes as the best expression of Congressional in-
tent. 8 The Act's definition of "joint work""' 9 requires that there be
two or more "authors." Unfortunately, neither the Act nor legislative
history defines "author." The court in Childress2' said that "author"
appears to be used only in its sense as an originator. One legal dic-
tionary12 defines "author" as the source of some form of intellectual
or creative work. In this sense, an "author" can simply be one who
creates ideas. If Congress intended to use "author" in this ordinary
sense, Nimmer is correct-contributions to a joint work need not be
independently copyrightable.
The legislative history, however, does not reveal Congress' intent
either. The "joint work" definition is only one of many provisions of
the Act. It is thus impossible to look to other provisions of the Act
and to read them in conjunction with the "joint work" definition so as
not to create inconsistencies. 22
116. Whelan Assocs, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc. 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
117. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, con-
cept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.").
118. "[I]t is a well-known canon of construction that the language of the statute is the
best indication of legislative intent." Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F.Supp. 847, 855 (D.N.J. 1981).
119. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
120. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 506 (2d Cir. 1991).
121. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 68 (5th ed. 1983).
122. "It is the duty of the court to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a
statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legislature was igno-
rant of the meaning of the language it employed." Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147,
152 (1883); see also United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955).
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After looking to the provision of the Act which sets out the sub-
ject matter of copyright,123 it is clear that an author will only receive
copyright protection if he fixes his original work of authorship in a
tangible medium of expression or authorizes such fixation. The Act
thus requires: 1) originality,124 2) authorship, and 3) fixation in a tan-
gible medium of expression.
Failure to comply with any one of these three elements will pre-
vent the author from getting copyright protection for his work. The
second element, authorship, standing alone, was probably meant in
the sense of an originator, as argued by the court in Childress.125 The
third element is separate and distinct from the authorship require-
ment. Thus, the term "author" or "authorship" standing alone, proba-
bly was used in the sense that Nimmer advocated, as the originator of
ideas. More importantly, Congress explicitly limited which authors
would be protected by the Act.
A protected author must produce more than ideas. She must
produce original expression fixed in a tangible medium. If the "au-
thor" does not meet these standards, the work is considered in the
public domain, outside the subject matter of copyright.' 26
The Act's definition of "fixed"'127 sheds light on this issue. As the
court in Andrien v. Southern Ocean County Chamber of Commerce128
said, "[tihe critical phrase [in the statutory definition of 'fixed'] is 'by
123. "(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly
or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following catego-
ries .... " 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
124. Section 102 of the 1976 Copyright Act specifically requires works of authorship to
be original. Originality is the most fundamental requirement for copyright protection no
matter the form of the work. Magic Mktg. v. Mailing Servs. of Pittsburgh, Inc. 634 F. Supp.
769, 771 (W.D. Pa. 1986). In fact, Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution explicitly
states that originality is a prerequisite for copyright protection. Originality does not mean
novelty, it simply means that the work must be original to the author. Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547-49 (1985). To be original, the Constitu-
tion requires an independent creation plus a modicum of creativity. Feist v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). The level of creativity required, however, is extremely
low, and even a slight amount is sufficient. Id.
125. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 506 (2d Cir. 1991); see supra text accompaning
note 82.
126. See 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, § 4.2.1.
127. "A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are
being transmitted, is 'fixed' for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made
simultaneously with its transmission." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
128. 927 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1991).
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or under the authority of the author."" 29 A work can be fixed by the
author himself, or he can authorize another person to fix the work for
him. When another person is authorized to fix the work, the process
must be by rote or mechanical transcription. 3 ° In other words, no
amount of thought or modification is allowed in the fixing process.131
This indicates that the author must contribute more than a simple
idea to another who fixes the work in a tangible medium of expres-
sion. The author must also have formed expression of the idea before
transferring the work to another to fix. The person who does the fix-
ing cannot engage in the creative process if the person who authorizes
the fixing is to be considered an author.'32
Viewed in this manner, "author" would take on its general defini-
tion of the originator of an idea. But "author" does not stand alone in
129. Id. at 134. See also supra text accompanying note 86.
130. Id. at 135.
131. Other courts have also recognized that an author under the Copyright Act can
only be one who "fixes" his work in a tangible medium of expression. In M.G.B. Homes,
for example, the court held that a person's contribution of ideas to the author were not
copyrightable because the person failed to 'create' the work within the meaning of the
statute. Section 101 of 17 U.S.C. states a work is 'created' when "it is fixed in a copy... for
the first time." So to be given author status under the Act, even joint author status, the
person must be a 'creator' as required by the Act, which means 'fixing' the expression of
the person's idea. 903 F.2d 1486, 1493 (11th Cir. 1990). See also supra text accompanying
note 102.
See also Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1318-19
(E.D. Pa. 1985), affd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). In
this case, only the plaintiff was declared the author of a computer program despite the
defendant's contribution of ideas as to how the program should look and work. The court
held that general assistance and contributions to the plaintiff's knowledge did not make the
defendant a creator of any original work or even a co-author. The court compared the
situation to architectural cases, where the owner explains the type and function of his
building to the architect. In those cases, no matter how detailed the owner's ideas and
limitations as to how the building should look, the drawings were not declared co-au-
thored. Therefore, even detailed explanations of ideas are not copyrightable, only expres-
sion of ideas.
See also Geshwind v. Garrick, 734 F.Supp. 644, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). ("The fact that
the agent, Geshwind, wanted changes in details and aspects of the portrait and even made
suggestions, the compliance with which may or may not have improved the effect, does not
make him the creator.")
But see Fisher v. Klein, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1795 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In this case, the defend-
ant was declared a joint author of a piece of jewelry even though the plaintiff made the
jewelry with his own hands and was substantially responsible for how the jewelry was to
look. The defendant contributed ideas as to how the jewelry should look, although her
contributions were small compared to that of the plaintiff. The court found that although
her contributions were small they were not insignificant. The court further said that her
contributions were not simply ideas, but were expression, because, for example, the de-
fendant at one point contributed exact specifications, and made other suggestions, such as
making the piece smaller and lighter. The plaintiff then 'fixed' the defendant's expression
for her. This case is discussed further in the text accompanying note 195 infra.
132. Andrien, 927 F.2d at 134-35.
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the Act. Other provisions give it added meaning. An author under
the Act becomes more than the simple originator of ideas: she be-
comes the source of expression for those ideas. Only as the expressor
of ideas does one become entitled to the protections afforded by the
Act. Section 201(a) of the Act provides that copyright ownership
"vests initially in the author or authors of the work." The Supreme
Court has stated that "as a general rule, the author is the party who
actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea
into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection."' 33
The added meaning given to the term "author" is further sup-
ported by § 102(b).13 4 The legislative history of § 102 makes it clear
that it was intended to codify the idea/expression dichotomy. 135 "It is
axiomatic that copyright does not protect ideas, but only expression of
ideas."' 36 This rule, first set down in Baker v, Selden, 37 has matured
into one of the fundamental tenets of copyright law. 138
Nimmer,'139 however, has suggested that copyright protection
should be granted to both the contributor of skeletal ideas as well as
to the person who fleshes out those ideas with expression. The Act
and case law simply do not support this notion. Section 102(b) of the
Act commences with the key phrase "[iun no case .... "140 This lan-
guage mandates that copyright protection never be given to the au-
133. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989).
134. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
135. Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1234.
136. Id.
137. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). See supra note 58 for a more complete discussion of this case
and the idea/expression dichotomy issue.
138. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) ("Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no
exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea-
not the idea itself." (citation omitted)); see also Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511
F.2d 904, 906 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975); Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 691
(2d Cir. 1926).
139. "Although a contribution may not contain protected expression,'it nonetheless
may constitute an important (sometimes disproportionately important) contribution to the
final product. A creator whose efforts may be extensive should not be excluded from shar-
ing these rewards, nor should the co-creator be over-rewarded by being deemed the sole
owner of the work." 1 NiMMER, supra note 3, § 6.07, at 6-22 (1993) (quoting Gerber, Joint
Authorship Requirements Questioned by the Courts, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 30, 1990, at 24).
140. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea ... regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or em-
bodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (emphasis added).
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thorship of ideas alone.1 41 There are no exceptions. This lack of
ambiguity in the statute is the best indication of Congress' intent. No
exception was made for joint authorship. The overwhelming majority
of the case law bears out these principles.' 42
D. What About Potential Inequitable Results?
It appears that the statute and cases require each joint author to
contribute a copyrightable contribution. When applied in this man-
ner, however, the law may produce inequitable results. Inequities
would be more prevalent in cases where the contributions of each au-
thor are inseparable 143 rather than interdependent. 44 When two au-
thors contribute interdependent material to a work, one must simply
look at each author's expression standing alone to determine
copyrightability 45 However, the issue becomes more complex when
each author's contributions are intertwined such that it becomes im-
possible to determine who contributed what material. If the authors
cannot point to separately copyrightable contributions, then are they
to be denied joint authorship status?
141. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir.
1986) ("The legislative history of this section, adopted in 1976, makes clear that § 102(b)
was intended to express the idea-expression dichotomy.").
142. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) ("As
a general rule, the author is the party who actually creates the work, that is, the person who
translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection.
§ 102."); Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[It is] the general
rule that a person must translate ideas into copyrightable expression to receive copyright
protection as an author of a work."); See also S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081,
1087 (9th Cir. 1989); BancTraining Video Sys. v. First Am. Corp., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 2014, 2017
(6th Cir. 1992); Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1234; Konigsburg Int'l, Inc. v. Rice, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
1876, 1877 (C.D. Ca. 1992); Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp: 847, 857 (D.N.J. 1981).
143. A work of joint authorship is inseparable if it is impossible to identify distinctly
each author's contribution to the unitary work. For example, a novel or a painting could
be an inseparable work, since it would be difficult to identify what part each author con-
tributed to the work due to the oneness of the work. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 3, § 6.04, at
6-12; see also H. R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 51, at 120, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5659, 5736.
144. A work of joint authorship is interdependent if the individual contributions of
each author are easily identifiable. For example, a motion picture, opera, or the words and
music of a song created by more than one person would be interdependent works. In these
cases, after each author's contribution is combined with the rest of the work, her work can
still be identified. It is comparable to a composite work, whereas an inseparable work is
comparable to a derivative work. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 3, § 6.04, at 6-12; see also H.R.
REP. No. 1476, supra note 51, at 120, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5659, 5736.
145. "It is frequently difficult to distinguish the idea from the expression thereof ...
[t]he distinction will 'inevitably be ad hoc."' Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab.,
Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Judge Learned Hand in Peter Pan Fabrics,
Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)).
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Clearly, a work of joint authorship with inseparable contributions
is entitled to copyright protection if it meets the law's requirements.
Moreover, a work deserving copyright protection must have an author
who owns the copyright. Therefore, if the requisite intent 146 of joint
authorship is manifested, the only workable solution is to consider
each author a joint owner of an undivided interest in the work.147 An
assumption is made that each author has contributed copyrightable
expression. This works well when there is no dispute between the pu-
tative joint authors as to their co-author status. However, when one
person claims to be a joint author and the others dispute that conten-
tion, then the issue of authorship becomes difficult to resolve.
One difficulty that often arises when one disputes the other per-
son's authorship, is the question of who contributed which material.
Did the party contribute expression and was it more than a de minimis
amount? Further, was their expression copyrightable standing on its
own? Yet another difficulty is finding proof of the substance of each
author's contribution. Usually the only proof of such contribution is
the author's own testimony and that of other witnesses. These ques-
tions are important because the author who cannot prove that he con-
tributed copyrightable expression, according to the majority view and
the view of this Article, will be denied co-author status and, conse-
quently, copyright protection.
Clearly, if one party contributed copyrightable expression but
cannot prove it, and the trier of fact determines that he has not proven
a copyrightable contribution, then injustice will result and the goal of
copyright to foster creativity will be denied. To this outcome, courts
should define a new method of determining authorship that promotes
the goals of copyright and ensures that all authors of copyrightable
expression receive the protection they deserve.
One possibility is to put the burden of proving lack of authorship
on the party who denies the other party's authorship status. This
method would involve a two part inquiry. First, the court should look
to the proof of the parties' intent to be joint authors. "Intent" is a
requirement for joint authorship as defined in the statute. 48 Proof of
intent is very strong evidence that a work of joint authorship exists.
Proof of intent, therefore, should create a presumption that there is a
work of joint authorship. This would also mean that there is a pre-
sumption that both parties contributed copyrightable expression.
146. See infra text accompanying note,154 for a discussion of the intent requirement to
joint authorship.
147. 1 NIMMER, supra note 3, § 6.02, at 6-5.
148. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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If the party who is seeking joint authorship status has proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that the parties intended to be joint
authors, then the burden shifts to the party denying joint authorship
to prove that the other party did not contribute copyrightable expres-
sion. This is the second part of the inquiry. Once a preponderance of
the evidence shows the existence of intent to be joint authors, a rebut-
table presumption arises that there is joint authorship and therefore a
copyrightable contribution. On rebuttal, the denying party must then
come forward with evidence that the other party does not deserve au-
thorship status. This would require proof that the person did not con-
tribute copyrightable expression. The trier of fact should be guided by
Section 102 of the Act, which requires that each party contribute ex-
pression. The expression must go beyond description of an idea and it
must be more than de minimis as defined by Nimmer.'49
This method reflects the copyright goal of fostering creativity, be-
cause it assumes joint authorship when intent is proven, and is thereby
less discouraging to potential joint authors. It also serves equity by
granting credit to all parties rather than denying one deserving copy-
right protection. It also comports with Congress' statement that the
touchstone of joint authorship is intent at the time of writing for each
author's work to be combined in a unitary whole. 5 ° Congress put
heavy emphasis on intent, which lends support for presuming joint au-
thorship when intent is proven. However, this does not negate the
fact that each author must contribute copyrightable expression as
mandated by the Act.
Although copyright laws require that copyrightable contributions
be made to attain joint author status, some deserving "authors" in the
originator sense will regrettably not be granted authorship status in
the Copyright Act sense. Nimmer151 makes a valid point that, for ex-
ample, in the movie making context, if a contributor supplies numer-
ous ideas, but others flesh out the ideas and they clearly were in
collaboration to produce a script, all parties should be considered joint
authors. Without great ideas, many innovative and creative movies
might not exist. So clearly, the goal of copyright to foster creativity
would be served by giving all contributors protection.
149. 1 NIMMER, supra note 3, § 6.07, at 6-22.
150. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 51, at 120, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5659,
5736.
151. 1 NIMMER, supra note 3, § 6.07, at 6-22 ("It is submitted that copyright's goal of
fostering creativity is best served, particularly in the motion picture context, by rewarding
all parties who labor together to unite idea with form, and that copyright protection should
extend both to the contribution of skeletal ideas and the contributor who fleshes out the
project.").
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It obviously would be ideal to recognize the contributions of crea-
tive idea makers with legal protection. However, we do not live in an
ideal world and therefore "pragmatic considerations"'' 5 2 must be
made. The court in Whelan'53 has pointed out that copyright law has
two competing purposes. While the law promotes creative incentive,
it also promotes dissemination of information to promote learning,
culture and development. The purpose of copyright law is to effi-
ciently balance these competing goals. This balance is achieved
through the court's use of the idea/expression dichotomy. Only ex-
pression is protected by copyright, lest authors receive a legal monop-
oly on ideas. Monopoly ownership in ideas themselves would not
serve the goal of disseminating information to the public. However,
ideas can be expressed in many ways, so through the expression of
ideas authors will receive legal protection, thereby continuing to fos-
ter creativity, but keeping the ideas free for public use.Pragmatic considerations that serve as the foundation of copy-
right law would prevent those who only create ideas from receiving
copyright protection. Although an author of ideas seeking joint au-
thorship status might deny that she were doing so to seek a monopoly
on the idea itself, there is the danger that spurious claims of joint au-
thorship will arise from those claiming to have created the ideas used
in a work. Since the goal of copyright is to create an efficient balance
between creative incentive and dissemination of information, authors
of ideas, even in a joint work setting, should be denied copyright
protection.
IV
The Intent Requirement
The 1976 Copyright Act defines a "joint work" as "a work pre-
pared by two or more authors with the intention that their contribu-
tions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole."' 54 The Act does not define "intent," nor does it elaborate on
how the intent requirement is to be applied in the joint work context.
The legislative history does little to clarify this important requirement
of joint authorship. The Congress says that a work is joint "if the au-
152. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,1235 (3d Cir. 1986)
("[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men
of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the community, may not be
deprived of their just merits, and the reward for their ingenuity and labour; the other, that
the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded."
(quoting Lord Mansfield in Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng.Rep. 138, 140 n.6 (1785))).
153. Id.
154. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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thors collaborated with each other, or if each of the authors prepared
his or her contribution with the knowledge and intention that it would
be merged with the contributions of other authors as 'inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary whole."1 55
This statement by the Congress would suggest that mere "collab-
oration" would be sufficient to declare one a joint author.156 That
Congress intended this proposition seems highly doubtful when one
sentence later it declares that "the touchstone here is the intention, at
the time the writing is done, the parts be absorbed or combined into
an integrated unit .. -.7 Clearly, an intent to be joint authors is
absolutely necessary to attain joint author status. Therefore collabo-
ration alone, absent intent, is insufficient to establish joint authorship.
Conversely, it would seem that intent for joint authors, absent collab-
oration, would not be sufficient for joint author status. In other
words, two parties merely declaring themselves joint authors without
each making copyrightable contributions158 is insufficient for joint au-
thor status. In this case, only joint owner status could be achieved by
the true author assigning partial ownership in his copyright to the
other party.' 59 It is unclear why Congress included the statement that
joint author status can be achieved by collaboration alone. But when
looked at in context with other statements it would appear its inclu-
sion may be the result of poor draftsmanship.
Of greater importance is Congress' statement that a work is
"joint" if each of the authors prepares his contribution with the
knowledge and intent that it would be merged with the contributions
of other authors as "inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole."' 6 Several observations can be made about the wording of
this statement. First, it suggests that the intent to combine works must
exist in the author's mind at the moment he is creating his own contri-
bution. Therefore, a work cannot be joint if the author intended to
155. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 51, at 120, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5659,
5736.
156. See Words & Data, Inc. v. GTE Communications Servs., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 570, 575
(W.D. Mo. 1991) ("[Clollaboration is an independent ground for finding the necessary
intent for joint authorship").
157. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 51, at 120, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N at 5659,
5736.
158. See supra note 51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirement that
each putative co-author of a joint work contribute copyrightable material.
159. See supra note 51 and accompanying text for a discussion as to how a joint work
differs from joint authorship and why the difference is important.
160. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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combine his work with that of another only after he had created his
work of authorship.'61
Second, the statement explicitly says that the authors must have
both knowledge and intent to combine their works. Did Congress in-
tend two separate requirements or were they simply being redundant?
Considering Congress only mentions "intent" in its § 101 definition of
"joint work" it is more reasonable to conclude that only "intent" is
required. In addition, where intent is established, then knowledge
that the contributions will be merged seems certain. However, merely
having the knowledge that ones work will be combined with another
does not necessarily indicate intent to be a joint author. For example,
a newspaper editor may have the knowledge that her suggestions will
be included in an article, but there may be no intent that the editor
will share the byline with the article's author. It can therefore be ar-
gued that knowledge alone, absent intent, will not make one a joint
author.1
6 2
Third, the statement requires that the authors intend for their
contributions to be merged into a unitary whole. So before creating
her individual work, each author must realize and intend that her
work will be part of a greater work. This statement by Congress may
seem clear on its face, but when closely examined is somewhat ambig-
uous. The ambiguity relates to the object of the author's intent. Does
the Act require simply that each author have the intent to combine
her work into a "unitary whole" with another's work, or must we look
deeper into the author's mind and determine whether she had the in-
tent to achieve joint author status.
Suppose that a novelist submits a first draft of a book she is writ-
ing to a publisher for consideration. Further suppose that the pub-
lisher likes the book, but requires that certain changes be made to the
text. Some suggestions amount to copyrightable expression, although
quantitatively minute compared to the author's contribution. The au-
thor agrees and accepts the publisher's changes. Only the author's
name appears on the novel cover as the author of the book. The issue
may arise as to whether the publisher in this case can be deemed a
joint author.
161. "The touchstone here is the intention, at the time the writing is done, that the parts
be absorbed or combined into an integrated unit ...... H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 51,
at 120, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5659, 5736 (emphasis added); see also 1 NIMMER,
supra note 3, § 6.03, at 6-8 ("The preconcerted common design, or, in the words of the
Copyright Act, 'the intention that their contributions be merged' (17 U.S.C. § 101) must
exist at the moment in time when the work is created, not at some later date.").
162. See infra text accompanying note 195.
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Since the publisher did contribute copyrightable expression, the
only remaining issue is whether each author intended to combine their
contributions into a "unitary whole." For argument's sake, assume
that the author knew beforehand that any work created would be cri-
tiqued by a publisher, and that the publisher's work would be com-
bined with the author's work. Also, it is clear that when the publisher
was writing his comments he knew they would be included in the au-
thor's novel. These assumptions therefore satisfy the time of the in-
tent, but the question remains as to the object of each author's intent.
Clearly, the author and publisher had intent to combine the pub-
lisher's comments and suggestions with the author's written text. The
author had knowledge that the publisher would most likely not pub-
lish the novel without inclusion of the comments, and therefore the
comments would be merged with her work. Likewise, the publisher
had knowledge that the comments would be included in the author's
novel, because he would not publish the novel without the changes
being made. Thus, the author and publisher intended for each other's
contributions to be combined into a "unitary whole." If we are to
take the joint work definition at face value, then it would appear that
the author and publisher could be considered joint authors, and that
the publisher would be entitled to all the benefits attendant to joint
authorship.
However, it seems doubtful in the above scenario that the author
ever intended to share joint author status with the publisher, and vice
versa. The author most likely considered the novel her own master-
piece with sole credit for authorship vesting in herself. To share au-
thorship status with a publisher whose contributions were mostly
technical, and if substantive, minute compared to the author's, would
probably have been repulsive to the author. Thus, however clear the
author's intent is to combine her work with the comments of the pub-
lisher into a unitary whole, it is unclear, and in this case doubtful, that
the author intended to share joint author status with the publisher.
Although it may seem highly improbable that a court would ever
grant joint author status to a publisher, as in the above scenario, the
issue illustrated could be of significance in other situations. Did Con-
gress adopt the broad view that putative co-authors must only intend
to combine their works into a unitary whole, or did they adopt a nar-
row view that the putative co-authors must have intended to share
joint author status? 163 The legislative history does not answer this
question, so we must look to the case law for possible answers.
163. See 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11,. § 4.2.1.1, in which Goldstein seems to stress the
broad view: "The determination that a work is a joint work will turn in any case on
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A. How the Federal Courts Have Applied the Intent Requirement
The element of "intent" for joint authorship as required by the
1976 Copyright Act' 64 had its roots in the common law of the federal
courts.165 The pre-1976 Copyright Act case law laid out the rules for
joint authorship, which basically concerned "intent."
The case law prior to the Act can be summed up as follows. Joint
authorship status means that several parties must contribute to a work
under a preconcerted and common design.' 66 However, this does not
require the authors to know each other, or to work together, just that
they, prior to starting the work,'6 7 intend to combine their work with
the other's.168 The several authors need not work in concert, but the
author must intend that his work will be made a part of a larger work,
regardless of who the other contributors might be . 69 Further, it is not
required that each author make equal contributions, either qualita-
tively or quantitatively. 7 ° One controversial case' 7 ' ruled that the
"intent" necessary for joint authorship could be formed after the work
whether the collaborators intended to merge their contributions intoa unitary whole. The
House Report on the 1976 Copyright Act observes that the 'touchstone' of a joint work is
'the intention, at the time the writing is done, that the parts be absorbed or combined into
an integrated unit ....' (emphasis added).
164. "A 'joint work' is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that
their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (emphasis added).
165. See supra text accompanying note 22.
166. See Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (Joint authorship "would
arise only when several parties contributed their labor to the production by common and
preconcerted design."); see also 1 NIMMER, supra note 3, § 6.03, at 6-7 ("The essence of
joint authorship is a joint laboring in furtherance of a preconcerted common design.").
167. See Sinkler v. Goldsmith, 623 F. Supp. 727 (D.C. Ariz. 1985) (holding a book
which included letters written by the plaintiff's deceased husband was not jointly authored
by the defendant and plaintiff's husband because there was no intent to create a joint work
at the time the letters were written, and thus the letters could not be published without the
plaintiff's consent).
168. See Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d
Cir. 1944) ("[Ilt makes no difference whether the authors work in concert, or even whether
they know each other; it is enough that they mean their contributions to be complementary
in the sense that they are to be embodied in a single work to be performed as such.").
169. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406, 410 (2d Cir.
1947) ("Suppose, for example. that after Burnett had composed the music, expecting his
wife to write the words, she had died or changed her mind about writing the lyrics, and
Burnett had then gone to Bennett and asked him to find someone to write the words. We
submit that no court would hold that the fact that when Burnett composed the music he
expected his wife to write the words, would make the actual song any less a 'joint work' of
Burnett and the lyricist found by Bennet. If that be true, it should make no difference that
Burnett's original design to have his music combined with his wife's words was in fact
realized.").
170. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1496 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (stating contributions of joint authors "need not be equal either quantitatively or
qualitatively." (citation omitted)). But see Kenbrooke Fabrics, Inc. v. Material Things, 223
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was already created. This rule eliminated the need for a "precon-
certed and common design". It was heavily criticized 172 but has not
been overruled. However, the 1976 Copyright Act is generally agreed
to have excluded the holding of this case. 173
These cases lay down the basic rules of intent for joint authorship,
but two questions remain. How do the courts look for evidence of an
author's intent? And, what must be the object of the author's intent,
e.g. combine into a unitary whole or joint author status? The federal
case law helps answer these questions.
Section 410(c) of the 1976 Copyright Act 174 creates a presump-
tion that only the author or authors listed on the registration certifi-
cate for the copyright are entitled to authorship status. A claimant
seeking author status must rebut this presumption with evidence of
co-authorship. 175 An example of a defendant's successful rebuttal of
the presumption of ownership is in BancTraining Video Systems v.
U.S.P.Q. 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (each party must have contributed substantively and signifi-
cantly for co-authorship to exist).
171. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.), modi-
fied on reh'g, 223 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955).
172. See Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640, 645-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
affd, 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972); Donna v. Dodd, Mead
& Co., 374 F.Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See supra text accompanying notes 115 for exam-
ples of cases which have criticized the "12th Street Rag" doctrine. See also 1 NIMMER,
supra note 3, § 6.03, at 6-9 to -10; 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 3, § 4.2.1, at 377.
173. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 3, § 6.03, at 6-9 ("Although the current Copyright Act is
not explicit on the point, it apparently incorporates the Marks and Melancholy Baby hold-
ings that an intention by the respective authors at the moment of creation to merge the
work with other works is sufficient to create a joint authorship upon such merger although
each joint author was initially unaware of the identity of the other contributors and contri-
butions. But the current Act rejects the further extension of the concept of joint author-
ship as formulated in a subsequent decision, popularly known as the '12th Street Rag'
case."). See also 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, § 4.2.1, at 377 ("The Register's 1961 Report
on the pending copyright revision observed that, [w]e would not go so far as the theory of
the Twelfth Street Rag decision, but would adopt the test laid down by the earlier line of
cases-that a joint work is one created by two or more authors who intend to have their
contributions joined together as a single work."). But note that although the 12th Street
Rag decision may not apply to works created after 1978, the year the 1976 Copyright Act
went into effect, whether that case still applies to works created before 1978 is unclear.
174. 17 U.S.C. 410(c) (1988). "In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registra-
tion made before or within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute
prima facia evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate.
The evidentiary weight to be accorded the certificate of a registration made thereafter shall
be within the discretion of the court." Id. (emphasis added).
175. See 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 11, § 4.2.1, at 378 ("[T]he presumptions of validity
and authenticity that section 410(c) of the Copyright Act attaches to copyright registration
certificates implies that a putative coauthor who is not identified as an author in the regis-
tration certificate has the burden of proving that he is in fact a co-author.")
First American Corp.176 The plaintiff, BancTraining, listed itself as the
owner of the copyright under the work-for-hire doctrine. However,
they also claimed ownership under the joint-work doctrine.
The defendant successfully rebutted this presumption without
even presenting any of their own evidence. The presumption was re-
butted by the testimony of the plaintiffs own employee. 177 The em-
ployee's testimony revealed that her involvement in the project was
minimal; the ideas she contributed and her supervision of the video
did not rise to the level of joint authorship. 78 With the presumption
rebutted, the burden of proof shifted back to the plaintiff. The plain-
tiff failed to produce any evidence of joint authorship or work made
for hire, so therefore they failed to prove ownership. 179
This case shows that one way courts can determine intent is by
looking to the names listed on the copyright certificate of registration.
The data on the certificate is presumed to be true. Thus, if only one
author is listed, there is a rebuttable presumption that only one author
created the work. Likewise, if two authors are listed, and the joint
work or work-made-for-hire box is checked off, it is presumed the au-
thors intended a joint work. It is then up to the opposing party to
present evidence that affirms or negates intent.
Another way that courts find intent to be joint authors is to as-
sume joint authorship. This only occurs in situations where each au-
thor's contributions are intertwined with the finished work such that
176. 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 2014 (6th Cir. 1992). In a footnote, the court pointed out that just
because BancTaining checked off the work for hire box on the copyright registration form,
this did not limit BancTraining to claiming ownership under that doctrine alone. Id. at
2016 n.3 (citing Frost Belt Int'l Recording Enters. v. Cold Chillin' Records, Inc., 758 F.
Supp. 131, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)). Therefore, the certificate may create a presumption of
ownership under the joint work or work made for hire doctrines.
177. Id. at 2017. In another footnote, the BancTraining court cited Kingsrow Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Metromedia, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), for the proposition that
a defendant need not present independent evidence to rebut the presumption of author-
ship, but may rely on the plaintiff's own testimony.
178. The defendant also rebutted the presumption of ownership under the work-for-
hire doctrine. The court found that independent contractors, not Banc'Raining's own em-
ployee created the tapes.
179. See also Intown Enterprises v. Barnes, 721 F. Supp. 1263 (N.D. Ga. 1989). In this
case, the plaintiff, a developer of homes, commissioned a series of drawings from architect
Ben Dooley, and obtained a copyright for the drawings in 1988. In 1987, the defendant
made unauthorized copies of the drawings and subsequently used them to build a house.
The plaintiff charged the defendant with copyright infringement. The defendant argued
that the plaintiff was not an author, while the plaintiff claimed joint authorship. Not only
did the court find that the drawings were owned by the plaintiff under the work-for-hire
doctrine due to the amount of control plaintiff had over Dooley, but the court also found
the plaintiff to be a joint author, because the plaintiff supervised and participated in the
creation of the drawings.
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neither author could specifically point to their individual contribu-
tions. It is assumed, therefore, that each author has contributed copy-
rightable expression. Typical works where this would apply would be
a novel or painting."80 This assumption that intent exists, however,
will not work when there is a dispute as to the significance of each
author's contribution to the work.
There is an area of copyright that illustrates this problem very
well; the cases dealing with architectural drawings. These cases also
identify another way in which courts determine the parties intent, by
looking at business custom. For example, in Johnstone v. Fox' the
court pointed out that in the architectural business, mere involvement
by a client in creating architectural plans will not make the client a co-
author. However, this general rule can be overcome by the client who
proves he actively participated in preparation of the drawing and also
controlled the development of the design.'8 2 The court did not define
what active participation or control involved, but it certainly would
need to rise to the level of authorship. 83 Support for this proposition
can be found in Meltzer v. Zoller.184
180. See Johnstone v. Fox, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1229, 1232 (N.D. I11. 1987) ("Thus, where the
respective contributions of each author are not separately identifiable-as in the case of a
novel or a painting-then each contributor may be deemed a joint author.").
181. 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1229, 1232 (N.D. Il1. 1987). Fox hired Johnstone of C&M Builders to
design a new kitchen. Fox worked with Johnstone over several months in preparing draw-
ings for the kitchen. C&M employees prepared all the drawings, but incorporated the
Foxes' ideas and sometimes their specific instructions. After months of work, Johnstone
came up with a final drawing that she showed to the Foxes, but which had no copyright
notice on it. For unspecified reasons, the Foxes decided not to hire Johnstone to build the
kitchen. The Foxes eventually hired Riviera Kitchens to do the job. Riveria made draw-
ings of a proposed kitchen, which the Foxes approved, and thereafter they hired a local
contractor to build the kitchen according to the specification drawn by Riveria. Upon
completion, the kitchen was featured in the Chicago Tribune and another magazine which
praised the kitchen's unique design. The design was attributed to Riviera and the Foxes.
Johnstone saw the articles and contacted the Chicago Tribune and made slanderous state-
ments about the Foxes. Later, Johnstone filed a copyright registration naming herself as
author of the kitchen plans. She then filed the lawsuit. Id. at 1231. Neither party argued
that the kitchen plans were a work of joint authorship, but the court concluded that what
actually may have been at issue was joint authorship. The court felt that the facts as to the
Foxes contribution to the work were in dispute, and since the matter was on a motion for
summary judgment, the court denied the motion and set the matter for trial. Id. at 1232.
182. Id.
183. See supra text accompanying note 115.
184. Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1981). In this case, the plaintiff wanted
to build a home and met with Doran, a defendant, who owned Xenco, a home construction
business. Xenco commissioned an architect, Zito, to create the plans. Zito worked for the
architectural firm of William Chirgotis. Zito prepared some sketches based on an old
Chirgotis plan, but modified it to the plaintiff's requirements. The ultimate plans used to
build the house were based in part on old Chirgotis plans, Zito's work, Doran's sugges-
tions, and requirements made by the plaintiff which he outlined in sketches. The Chirgotis
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In Meltzer, the plaintiff commissioned an independent contractor,
an architectural firm, to create plans for building a home. The issue
arose as to who owned the copyright to the house drawings. The court
looked to the intent of the parties to determine who the copyright
would vest in. Absent an express agreement, 185 which was the case
here, a rebuttable presumption would vest copyright in the commis-
sioning party. This presumption could be rebutted by evidence of cus-
tom of the industry or by pattern of dealings.
The court held that the presumption was overcome by evidence
that the parties intended for the architect to own the copyright. 186
The custom of the architectural profession was for the architects to
own the copyright unless there is an express agreement to the con-
trary. In addition, the evidence showed that for fifteen years the de-
fendant had retained copyright ownership in all its drawings absent
express agreement to the contrary. 8 7
The plaintiff also argued that the drawings belonged to him be-
cause he contributed ideas, made changes and exercised approval
power. The court rejected this argument finding that the defendant
created the plans and contributed most of the ideas. Because the de-
fendant "fixed" the plans pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 101, it was the crea-
tor of the plan and the author for copyright purposes. The skeletal
ideas contributed by the plaintiff did not constitute fixed expression of
ideas. The plaintiff was not a joint author for the same reasons.""
From these cases we see that industry custom can be used to show
intent absent any contrary evidence. But if there is a dispute as to
contribution, the putative author or co-author will not be allowed
copyright owner status without proof of authorship. As the court in
firm considered the plans for the plaintiff's home as stock plans which it owned and was
free to use on other projects. After the plaintiff's home was constructed, the defendant
Zoller wanted to build a home just like that of the plaintiff, and they hired Doran for the
project. The Zoller home plans were substantially similar to that of the plaintiff's. The
plaintiff sued for copyright infringement claiming it was the sole owner of the plans.
185. See Words & Data, Inc. v. GTE Communications Servs., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 570, 575
(W.D. Mo. 1991) ("The presence or absence of an express conclusory claim of authorship
is not determinative of whether one is, in fact, a joint author of a work. In a joint work,
'each contributor automatically acquires an individual ownership in the entire work
.. '(quoting 1 MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 6.03, at 6-6 (1990))).
186. The court also found that the plaintiff did not commission the work. Meltzer, 520
F.Supp. at 855.
187. Id. at 856-57.
188. Id. at 857.
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Meltzer said,'89 "[w]ithout authorship, the sine qua non of copyright,
plaintiff has no cause of action."' 9 °
In some situations, there will be no express agreements, industry
customs, oral statements or other such evidence to show intent. In
these cases, the courts may infer intent from the surrounding circum-
stances. For example, in Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel
Music Co.,"' the author of the words to a song submitted the words to
a publisher knowing that the words would be put to music by someone
else. Likewise, the person hired to write the music for the song knew
that the music and words would eventually be one product. Both par-
ties realized that in order to have a commercially viable song, the
words and music had to be combined as one. Even though the parties
never met each other, the circumstances indicate that each party had
the intent to create a unitary work with the words and music function-
ing as one. Although their works could be used separately, the pur-
pose was to create one commercial song. Absent such circumstances,
it is presumed that each separate work has its own copyright apart
from the whole work. 9 2
Even when a contract exists where the parties agree to collabo-
rate with each other on a project, it does not necessarily follow that
the parties intend to be joint owners of the copyright. For example, in
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting,'93 the court stated that if the con-
189. Id.
190. See M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990), in
which the issue arose whether M.G.B. was a co-author of floor plans for a home because of
the control and discretion he exercised over the final drawings. The court did not find joint
authorship because the thumbnail sketches provided by the putative co-author were nor-
mally expected by clients of architectural firms, and such involvement does not render the
client an "author." There was no evidence of intent to be co-authors. In addition, the
putative co-author could not be considered a "creator" because the ideas he conveyed
were not copyrightable.
See also Boggs v. Japp, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1040 (E.D. Va. 1988), in which a plaintiff claimed
joint authorship of a book, but there was no evidence that the plaintiff contributed any
ideas about the plot, characters, scenery, descriptions, illustrations or anything else. Since
the plaintiff contributed non-copyrightable expression, the court held that she was not a
joint author. And even if she had contributed plot ideas and characters, that still would not
be enough for joint authorship, because ideas alone are not sufficient.
191. See also supra text accompanying note 28.
192. See Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (par-
ties not joint authors because there was no evidence of collaboration, and, therefore, no
intent to create a new work.); see also Designers View, Inc. v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 764
F. Supp. 1473 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (parties not joint authors because there was no evidence of
collaboration in designing decorative panels for a food store chain; thus, there was no in-
tent to be joint authors); Words & Data, Inc. v. GTE Communications Servs., Inc., 765 F.
Supp. 570, 575 (W.D. Mo. 1991) ("[Clollaboration is an independent ground for finding the
necessary intent for joint authorship.").
193. 538 F.2d 14, 22 (2d Cir. 1976).
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tract indicates that one author will retain a superior interest in the
work, then the parties did not consider themselves as joint authors of
a single work. It therefore appears that any agreement between con-
tracting parties which includes terms that cut against the spirit or goals
of joint authorship suggests the parties did not have the intent neces-
sary to be joint authors.
B. A Broad or Narrow View of Intent?
All of the cases discussed answer the question as to how the
courts go about determining a party's intent. But, those cases have
not discussed what the object of the author's intent should be focused
on. Not until Childress v. Taylor,'94 a Second Circuit opinion, has this
issue been specifically addressed. The case law prior to Childress pro-
vides some nebulous clues as to how courts may have felt about this
issue. The following discussion will attempt to discern what position,
if any, was taken by the courts on this issue, and then discuss Childress
in light of these opinions.
For example, in Fisher v. Klein195 the court seemingly endorsed
the narrow view that authors must intend the legal status of joint au-
thorship. In Fisher, the plaintiff (Fisher) was a jewelry maker. The
defendant (Klein) was a student of Fisher. Both parties formed an
association to design, sculpt and market items of jewelry. The plaintiff
did all the sculpting and the defendant managed the business. Klein
also contributed some ideas as to how the jewelry should look. On
several of the pieces sculpted by the plaintiff, the defendant listed
both herself and the plaintiff as co-authors on the copyright registra-
tion. For one particular pendant, the defendant listed herself as a
joint author, and the plaintiff signed the registration. 96 The court dis-
cussed two issues: 1) whether Klein made a contribution that the
copyright laws would recognize as authorship, and 2) whether the au-
thors had the intention to merge their contributions into inseparable
or interdependent parts of a unitary whole. The second issue is the
issue on point.197
The court found a shared intent to merge their contributions,
even though Klein only made suggestions which Fisher carried out.
The evidence of intent came from the copyright registrations listing
both as joint authors, Fisher's signature of approval on the registra-
tion, and Fisher's description of himself as a co-author. The most per-
194. 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991).
195. 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1795 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
196. Id. at 1796.
197. See supra note 131.
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suasive evidence was an agreement by the parties which stated that
"Klein and Fisher shall share in the creative processes. ' 198 Because
the agreement came after long discussion between the parties, the
court found that Fisher was aware of the concept of the shared crea-
tive process.
Fisher had the state of mind or intention required by § 101. The
court distinguished this case from the architectural cases, where ideas
alone were contributed with no evidence of intent. Here, the defend-
ant's contribution of ideas were brought to fruition by the plaintiff and
there was evidence of intent.199 The court held that "[i]t does not fol-
low that because suggestions are made and adopted that a joint copy-
right has been created, because there is this additional requirement of
the shared intention that the contributions be merged into a unitary
whole, that is to say, into a work of joint authorship."2°0 Further, "It is
only where that dominant author intends to be sharing authorship that
joint authorship will result." 0'
This holding suggests that the court was equating intent to merge
contributions into a unitary whole with intent to be joint authors. The
second quotation above specifically requires intent to share author-
ship, not simply intent to merge contributions. There is no explana-
tion as to why the court took this narrow view of intent. It is possible
that the court did not see the distinction between the broad and nar-
row applications of intent, and simply applied the standard in the way
it assumed was proper.
Two other cases, however, suggest that the broad view of intent
would apply. For example, in Strauss v. The Hearst Corp.,2 the
plaintiff, Strauss, photographed fishing tackle for a Popular Mechanics
magazine article. The contents of the photos were strictly dictated by
Popular Mechanics' employees. Strauss and the Popular Mechanics
employees worked together to create the photographs. An outside
firm then did computer touch ups of the photos. Later, and without
the plaintiff's permission, Popular Mechanics used the photos in a pro-
motional insert for the magazine. Strauss brought suit claiming he
owned the copyright and that the defendant was only granted a lim-
198. Fisher, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1797.
199. See supra text accompanying note 115 for a discussion of the requirement that
each putative co-author contribute copyrightable material, and for why Klein's "sugges-
tions" could be considered copyrightable.
200. Fisher, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1798 (emphasis added).
201. Id. (emphasis added).
202. 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1832 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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ited license to use the photos. The defendant claimed that they were
joint authors of the photographs.2 °3
The court held that the parties were joint owners of the copyright
because there was no doubt that the parties intended their contribu-
tions to be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a uni-
tary whole. The evidence the court points to speaks only of intent to
make "a unitary whole." For example, the court determined that
"both parties intended from the start for Strauss's photograph to be
incorporated into the magazine article." 2" They also cite a Strauss
deposition where it was apparent that Strauss "knew captions and
other copy would be superimposed upon the photograph when the
article was put in its final form. "205
This apparent support for the broad view of intent is bolstered by
the court's comments in a footnote of the opinion. In the footnote it
was stated that although Strauss knew the photograph would be incor-
porated in the article, he denied that "he intended to create a joint
copyright. '20 6 In an affidavit Strauss claims that joint ownership was
never discussed, and had it been, he never would have consented to it.
The court found these self-serving statements irrelevant and stated
that "[e]ven though Strauss may not have intended the legal conse-
quences that attach to his actions, he does not deny that he still had
the requisite intent to participate in the creation of pages 86 and 87
.... "207 Clearly, to this court, the intent to take on the legal conse-
quences of joint authorship is not the test of intent under § 101;
rather, the test is whether the parties intended to create one unitary
work.
In Words & Data, Inc. v. GTE Communications Services, Inc.,
several statements made by the court suggest that they also subscribe
to the broad view of intent. For example, the court cites Nimmer's
statement that "the design of collaboration between joint authors
need be preconcerted only in the sense that at the time each author
makes his contribution he intends that it shall be an integrated part of a
greater work .... "208 Also, the court found that when Words & Data
contributed to the work in dispute "it did so intending that they would
203. Id. at 1833, 1834.
204. Id. at 1837.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. (emphasis added).
208. Words & Data, Inc. v. GTE Communications Servs., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 570, 575
(W.D. Mo. 1991) (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 6.03, at 6-
8).
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be integrated with the contributions of Sprint [the defendant]. '20 9 In
addition, when pointing out that Words & Data needed Sprint's input
to create the form Words & Data had been hired to create, the court
said that Words & Data could not have intended to author the work
without taking Sprint's contributions and merging it into a "unitary
whole. ,"210
When examining all these statements, one gets the impression
that the court is emphasizing that the object of the author's intent
must be to create a "unitary whole." Nowhere does the court talk
about intending to be a joint author. So again, this court would ap-
pear to adopt the broad view of intent, assuming that this court under-
stood the distinction between the broad and narrow view.
As stated previously, it was not until the Second Circuit decided
Childress211 that this aspect of intent was explicitly acknowledged and
discussed. The court recognized that the wording of the statute for
joint works "appears to make relevant only the state of mind regard-
ing the unitary nature of the finished work .... , The court cor-
rectly observed that such a broad scope of intent would give joint
author status to people to which Congress would not have contem-
plated doing so. The court, however, failed to cite anything that
would clarify what Congress may have intended. The court assumed
Congress would not have contemplated joint author status in such sce-
narios as the writer-editor and writer-researcher scenarios. The latter
situation was the example posed earlier in this Article. In both of
these situations, the parties intended to merge their contributions into
a unitary work, but the writer is the only one who expects author sta-
tus. As the court stated, there "is the lack of intent of both partici-
pants in the venture to regard themselves as joint authors. 2 13
The important issue, therefore, becomes whether the putative co-
authors regard themselves as joint authors. The court said this ques-
tion is especially important in situations like that in Childress where
one author is clearly the dominant author, as opposed to traditional
forms of collaboration, such as between the writers of the words and
music of a song.214
The lower court ruled that the requisite intent was not present
because "Childress never shared Taylor's notion that they were co-
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991). See supra note 78 for the facts of
Childress.
212. Childress, 945 F.2d at 507.
213. Id. (emphasis added).
214. Id. at 508.
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authors of the play."21 Taylor argued that this holding was a misap-
plication of the statute because it focuses on whether Childress in-
tended the legal consequences of her acts. The present court ruled
that the district court did not go that far, but simply required that the
parties "entertain in their minds the concept of joint authorship,
whether or not they understood precisely the legal consequences of
that relationship." '216 Although it is not required for a party to under-
stand the exact legal consequences that flow from joint authorship, the
parties must understand something about the joint author relationship
such that it could become the object of their intent.217
It would be a question of fact depending on the circumstances in
each case as to whether the parties regarded themselves as joint au-
thors. The court suggests that in some cases a useful test would be,
absent agreement, whether each party intended that all would be
identified as co-authors.21 8
The court, in justifying this narrow view of intent, said that previ-
ous case law has inquired into how the putative co-authors regarded
themselves when ascertaining the existence of joint authorship. For
support, the court cited Fisher v. Klein, as previously discussed, and
three other cases-Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co.,219 Maurel v.
Smith,22I and Weissmann v. Freeman.221 In each of the three latter
cases, the court quoted one short sentence or part of a sentence which
it concluded was proof that these courts adopted the narrow view of
intent.222
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.; see also Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1318 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 493
U.S. 883 (1989) (use of one's own by-line constitutes prima facia evidence that the work
was intended to be joint).
219. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
220. 220 F. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
221. 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989).
222. The court in Childress looked at Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co. in which
the court, after examining the parties' written agreement, concluded that the "provisions
suggest that the parties did not consider themselves joint authors of a single work." 538
F.2d at 22 (emphasis added). Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508 (2d Cir. 1991).
From Fisher v. Klien, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1795, 1798 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) the court stated, "It is
only where that dominant author intends to be sharing authorship that a joint work will
result." (emphasis added). Childress, 945 F.2d at 508.
Childress also looked at language in Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d at 1318, in which
the court held that for one to be considered a joint author, each "must intend to contribute
to a joint work .... " (emphasis added). 945 F.2d at 508.
Finally, Childress looked at the following language in Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. at 198, "I
do find that they agreed at that time that Harry B. Smith was to take the scenario and work
upon it, if he approved it, that they agreed to a joint authorship in the piece, and they
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The reliance of the Childress court on these cases for support of
its proposition is somewhat specious. In none of the cases cited by the
court is there any discussion as to what Congress contemplated by the
term "intent." Indeed, the congressional history is devoid of any dis-
cussion as to how the intent requirement is to be applied. So to take a
sentence or a portion of a sentence out of an opinion and conclude
that those courts looked at evidence to see if each party regarded
themselves as being of joint author status seems to be reading far too
much into those brief snippets. The court needs something more con-
crete on which to hang its hat.
C. Discussion
It may be more reasonable to conclude, considering the lack of
legislative history or analysis by the courts, that the issue of a broad or
narrow scope of intent is simply undecided. Considering the complete
lack of any case law prior to Childress that even recognizes the issue,
it may be reasonable to conclude that the issue has been overlooked
because courts have not grasped the subtle distinction between the
broad and narrow views of intent. It seems that when the courts are
faced with the issue of intent as used in the statute, they apply the rule
in a way that seems obvious to them. The courts then go about find-
ing evidence of intent as instructed by the case law. This could be
done by looking at agreements, evidence of collaboration, or industry
custom. But this search of evidence may not always reveal how the
authors "regarded" each other. It may only suggest an intent to make
a unitary work, and indeed, in cases like Words & Data, Inc., this is
what actually happens.
Considering the utter lack of discussion on this issue, it would be
helpful to look at the goals and policies of copyright to figure out what
Congress most likely contemplated. However, it is a common rule of
construction that the language of a statute is the best evidence of leg-
islative intent.223 If this rule of construction is applied to the joint
work definition,224 a plain reading of the statute's language indicates
that Congress intended that authors need only intend to create a uni-
tary work, and not necessarily intend joint authorship in its legal
sense. If we assume this was Congress' intent then we must assume
that Congress intended for relationships such as writer-editor and
accepted whatever the law implied as to the rights and obligations which arise from such an
undertaking." (emphasis added).
223. Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F.Supp. 847, 855 (D.N.J. 1981).
224. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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writer-researcher to result in joint authorship. As discussed, this
would lead to many inequities and is contrary to common practice.
So, what was Congress' likely intent, considering that a plain
reading of the statute would lead to absurd results in certain situa-
tions? As a starting point, it should be reiterated that the purpose of
copyright law is to strike a balance between protection and dissemina-
tion of information that is efficient, in order to promote learning, cul-
ture, and development.225
Authors who do the majority of the work on a project would ob-
viously have greater incentive to produce creative works if they were
assured that a minor contributor, like an editor or researcher, would
not receive joint author status merely because a few copyrightable
contributions were combined with the author's work. When authors
have incentive to create with the knowledge that minor contributors
will not be credited with joint creation and will not derive half of the
economic benefit of their work, then the goals of promoting learning,
culture and development are clearly advanced. Therefore, for authors
who do a majority of the work on a creative project, the goals of copy-
right would be best served by making an inquiry as to whether the
contributors regarded themselves as co-authors, rather than only in-
quiring as to whether they intended to combine their works into a
"unitary whole." The Childress court recognized that how authors re-
gard themselves is most important in circumstances where one author
has been the major contributor, and less important when the putative
co-authors have made more equal contributions. 226 Although the
court in Childress did not explain why this issue requires less consider-
ation in the latter situation than the former, it would be logical to
conclude that when authors make more equal contributions there is
stronger evidence of intent to share joint author status, and the court
does not need to delve as deeply into the authors' minds to see how
they regarded themselves.
Similarly, in Maure1227 the court looked at the circumstances of
the case to infer intent. The circumstances can be used to infer intent
to create a unitary work, and also be used to infer intent to share joint
author status. It is a reasonable assumption that, unless expressly
agreed to otherwise, two equal contributors to a work intended to
share joint author status. However, as the contributions of one author
decreases, and the others increases, the issue of how the author's re-
225. See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir.
1986).
226. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508 (2d Cir. 1991).
227. See supra text accompanying note 22.
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garded each other becomes more and more clouded. At some point,
the court must make a more exacting consideration into whether the
authors considered the legal concept of joint authorship.
When contributions are equal, is the purpose of copyright served
by requiring the court to dig deeper into the authors' minds to see
how each regarded himself? In this situation, both are considered au-
thors after inquiring only into whether they intended to create a uni-
tary work. The reason is that equal contributions deserve equal
credit. Further, an author will have incentive to contribute to more
creative projects because if the court only inquires into intent in the
broad sense, there is less of a chance that the author will be robbed of
authorship status simply because he could not prove that both parties
intended the legal aspect of joint authorship. As an author's contribu-
tion lessens, the circumstantial inference that the authors intended the
legal aspect of joint authorship loses weight, and as a result the more
difficult task of proving this more specific intent increases the odds
that one will be unjustly denied joint author status.
Therein lies the dilemma. On the one hand, requiring proof of
intent in its narrow aspect provides justice to those authors who were
the major contributors to the work. Also, in cases where contribu-
tions are equal, it is easy to infer that the authors intended the legal
concept of joint authorship. On the other hand, as the contribution of
one author becomes less than fifty percent, the inference of intent to
be joint authors in a legal sense lessens and requiring the putative
coauthor to show a narrow intent is difficult. This will result in injus-
tice when the contribution was small but not minute compared to the
other author's contribution, and where they really did intend to be
joint authors. If the putative co-author cannot come up with proof, he
will be unjustly denied joint author status.
What is the most equitable solution? It is clear that in the cases
where one author is dominant, the court should require proof of in-
tent to be joint authors in the legal sense. Congress most certainly
would not have intended the absurd result of allowing minor contribu-
tors like editors to share author status with the true author. Not only
would that result cut against the purpose of copyright, but it defies
common sense and the general practice of the courts.
In situations where one author contributes less than fifty percent
but not a de minimus amount, it will sometimes be difficult to prove a
narrow intent which could lead to injustice. However, it would be
very difficult to draw a line where a more exacting consideration of
intent should be made, as in the case where one author is the majority
contributor, and in the case of equal contributions, where circum-
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stances strongly infer intent. So to be consistent, the courts should
always inquire into evidence as to how the authors regarded each
other. This evidence would consist of seeing how the parties "billed"
or "credited" the work, as Childress suggested, by express agreements,
evidence of oral agreements, circumstantial evidence, like amount of
contribution or collaboration, testimony of witnesses and the credibil-
ity of each party's testimony.
Granted this can be a very difficult inquiry when the evidence is
lacking, because it is often difficult to get into an author's mind, but it
is a necessary inquiry to carry out Congress' probable intent.
V
Conclusion
Given the extensive economic and moral benefits that go along
with authorship status, it is imperative that the law clearly define what
is required to attain joint authorship status. Without a refined set of
principles by which our courts can judge authorship, we run the risk of
robbing people of their intellectual property and of granting credit
where credit is not due. Creative works of authorship and the dissem-
ination of new ideas can only flourish if authors have a clear, well
defined set of laws under which to work.
As a first step, the courts must come to agreement on the nature
of each author's contribution to a joint work. To be granted joint au-
thor status, one must contribute copyrightable expression. The major-
ity of courts support this view. Indeed, it is a cornerstone of copyright
law that only expression, not ideas, may be copyrighted. This basic
copyright tenet should apply with equal force in the joint work con-
text. When the Copyright Act is read as a whole this conclusion is
bolstered, as it is apparent that Congress did not intend to set a differ-
ent standard for authors of joint works. If Congress had intended to
make a different copyrightability standard for joint authors, as op-
posed to sole authors, then it defies reason that Congress does not
even remotely suggest that idea in the Act.
As a second step, the courts must flesh out in great detail how the
intent requirement will be applied. When Congress wrote the joint
work provisions of the Act, it stressed the author's intent as the cen-
tral element of determining joint author status. Surprisingly, the
court's have not done a complete examination of this issue. It was not
until Childress v. Taylor228 that any court looked in depth at this re-
228. 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991).
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quirement and recognized that there can be a broad and a narrow
view of intent.
This Article suggests that courts take a narrow view of intent. By
determining whether putative co-authors intended the legal conse-
quences of joint authorship, as opposed to merely intending to create
a unitary work, the goals of copyright are advanced. By adopting this
view, however, the courts will face a difficult challenge. They must
look into the minds of the authors and determine how they regard
their legal relationships. This will demand a close scrutiny of all the
available evidence to decipher intent, but it is the only fair way to
ensure that only deserving authors are given proper credit.

